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Audit summary 
Between September 2010 and March 2011 Victoria experienced some of the most 
extensive and damaging floods in its history. These floods affected 70 of the 79 
Victorian local government areas, with 16 very severely impacted. Major damage was 
caused to whole communities, roads, rail networks, community infrastructure and the 
natural environment. Some communities were inundated several times, with repeat 
damage to homes, businesses and the agricultural sector.  
As at 31 January 2013, the total cost estimate for relief and recovery was $971 million.  
Under the provisions of the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements 
(NDRRA), the state shares costs with the Commonwealth. Following the floods the 
Commonwealth provided an advance payment under NDRRA of $500 million to 
Victoria.   
The key governance structure set up in March 2011 to lead the relief and recovery 
efforts was the Secretaries’ Flood Recovery Group (SFRG), comprising all 
departmental secretaries, Victoria Police, VicRoads and the Emergency Services 
Commissioner. The SFRG was co-chaired by the secretaries of the departments of 
Primary Industries (DPI) and Human Services (DHS). 
All state departments played a role in relief and recovery, with nine administering 
programs. The majority of initiatives were administered through the departments of 
Treasury and Finance (DTF), Human Services, Planning and Community Development 
(DPCD), Primary Industries and Sustainability and Environment (DSE). 
In all there were 45 programs in Victoria’s flood response and recovery effort. These 
included: 
x social programs providing financial assistance to families and individuals, 
counselling, case work support including outreach, temporary housing and 
community resilience projects  
x economic programs to support businesses, agriculture and other primary 
industries 
x built environment programs to repair damage to community assets, roads, 
bridges and other infrastructure  
x natural environment programs, including repairing damage to parks and 
reserves. 
This audit assessed the effectiveness and efficiency of the state’s relief and recovery 
arrangements in the aftermath of the 2010–11 floods. It focused on six departments 
which had a key role in delivering or arranging relief and recovery efforts—namely 
DTF, DHS, DPI, DPCD, DSE and the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC). 
DPC did not deliver any programs, but was instrumental in providing policy direction 
and advice to government and had a lead role in intergovernmental communication 
and reporting. 
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The audit also focused specifically on 15 programs which were key to community 
recovery, as distinct from programs for the repair of roads, bridges and other 
infrastructure. Emergency response aspects of the flood disasters were not examined. 
Victoria has experienced a rise in the frequency, scale and impact of natural disasters 
and the challenges posed by these events are increasing. In parallel to this audit the 
government has been pursuing reforms in emergency management. It released a 
White Paper on Victorian Emergency Management Reform (the White Paper), in 
December 2012. The proposed changes in emergency management governance and 
organisation are designed to address a range of issues including coordinating relief 
and recovery in communities, roles of key stakeholders and streamlining governance 
arrangements. A number of these issues were examined in this audit. 
Conclusions 
Leadership  
Emergency management in Victoria has been affected by a siloed approach in the past 
which worked against achieving vital collaboration between stakeholders. Yet the 
model chosen to lead the state relief and recovery efforts in 2010–11 perpetuated the 
model of multiple stakeholders each responsible for their own piece of the recovery 
task. A whole-of-government committee structure was established in March 2011 to 
manage flood relief and recovery. However, funding was proposed and administered 
separately by nine of the 10 departments involved. Without clear authority and with 
funding controlled by each department, the key governance committee, the SFRG, 
inevitably had a coordination rather than a leadership role. 
As a result there were lost opportunities for collaboration and the nine departments 
administering funding all had different arrangements, application processes and points 
of contact. This resulted in a fragmented approach, with 45 separate programs offered 
by the nine funds holders. The number of programs and the different, and often 
complex, application processes attached to each was confusing to local government 
and to affected communities at a time when they were dealing with the distress and 
damage caused by the floods. 
As the SFRG's authority to lead, intervene and change what departments were doing 
was constrained, some important issues requiring action were not addressed. These 
included the need to better support the councils that were struggling due to their limited 
capacity, and the need for long-term recovery plans to be developed and followed. In 
addition, no overarching evaluation of the floods relief and recovery effort was ever 
commissioned, although evaluations of a number of individual programs were 
conducted. 
Flaws in the governance of relief and recovery were clearly a function of the model 
chosen and not linked to the conduct of committee members who diligently oversaw 
relief and recovery programs run by departments and also fulfilled monitoring and risk 
management responsibilities. 
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The lack of evaluation is of major concern as it means that there has been no 
mechanism in place to capture what was done well and might be replicated in the 
future and what was done poorly. This means there is no overall assessment of 
effectiveness and no guarantee the state will not continue to use flawed strategies and 
programs.   
The audit also noted the comprehensive review undertaken by Neil Comrie AO, APM in 
the aftermath of the floods. The Review of the 2010–11 Flood Warnings and 
Response, issued in December 2011, identified where improvements are needed to 
assist local government and community recovery and made 93 recommendations 
across a broad range of preparation, response and recovery matters.  
The Victorian Government has responded to 31 of the recommendations, which 
principally relate to flood warnings. It has yet to respond formally to the remaining 
62 recommendations, including those relating to the adequacy of relief and recovery 
arrangements and the adequacy of service delivery and community resilience. The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) has advised that recommendations will inform future 
emergency management changes and activities. It is imperative that these 
recommendations, and the issues that they illustrate, not be overlooked and be 
incorporated into future recovery planning and practices. 
The audit notes that the new governance arrangements set out in the December 2012 
White Paper seek to establish clear leadership through the State Crisis and Resilience 
Council—to be chaired by the Secretary of DPC—and the creation of Emergency 
Management Victoria as the new overarching body for the state’s emergency 
management sector. These are important and necessary reforms but also need to take 
into account lessons learnt from past emergency events.  
In addition to the SFRG, the central agencies DTF and DPC played a key role liaising 
with the Commonwealth, especially DTF in the case of betterment under the NDRRA. 
There were lost opportunities to obtain Commonwealth funding to improve, or better, 
the disaster resilience of public assets as DTF did not provide clear guidance to 
councils and practical assistance to help build the business cases needed to win 
funding. 
However, a number of councils and departments have noted the proactive approach 
taken by DTF in contacting councils to help them apply for financial assistance. This is 
commendable, especially given that, as a central agency without a regional presence, 
DTF did not have existing networks and relationships in place. This proactive approach 
should be maintained in future disasters.  
Relief and recovery efforts on the ground 
In addition to the central governing committee, the SFRG, there were various 
committees at the regional and local level, many of which functioned well. But overall, 
the number of committees at a state, regional and local level created a complex and 
unwieldy structure, which was difficult for affected communities to understand. 
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The 15 relief and recovery programs examined in this audit provided appropriate 
coverage of social, economic and environmental needs. The programs delivered much 
required relief and recovery support to the disaster-affected communities. There were 
no apparent gaps where needs were not answered by program initiatives. However, 
the fragmented approach from nine departments, with each managing funding and 
designing their own programs, resulted in considerable differences in application 
processes and eligibility. This created a confusing set of program rules. Local 
government and communities also had to deal with many different departmental staff 
fronting the various initiatives, which added to confusion and frustration in some 
communities already under considerable stress following the disaster. 
Despite these difficulties most local councils fulfilled their part in relief and recovery 
activities effectively, especially given the uncertainty about the true extent of damage 
concealed by flood waters, and the capacity issues in some councils. Much of the 
success on the ground can be attributed to local councils working together and the 
tireless work done by volunteers, service groups, charitable organisations and 
community service organisations. This experience shows that—while good planning 
and procedures are important, and familiarity with those procedures and staff training 
will continue to be critical to how well emergency response, relief and recovery occurs 
at the local level—relationships and shared knowledge will also play a very powerful 
role in determining success. 
Outlook for the future 
Recovery is a long-term and complex process and in most flood affected areas the 
recovery process is still underway.  It is important that effort and priority is maintained 
for longer-term recovery planning so that communities' resilience, confidence and 
economies can be rebuilt along with their physical infrastructure.  
Looking further into the future, the government has clearly signalled that the way in 
which emergencies are managed needs to be reformed if we are to meet the 
challenges of more severe and frequent disasters. The White Paper which sets out the 
government’s reform agenda for emergency management is a key plank in improving 
how the state manages emergencies of all kinds. Reform involves improvement and 
innovation based on identified weaknesses in current arrangements. If a true reform 
agenda is to be enacted then old problems in emergency management, which were 
not addressed in the floods relief and recovery efforts, will need to be tackled.  
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Findings 
Governance and planning 
The governance model, based on the SFRG, and using existing departmental 
structures and arrangements, did not encourage either collaboration or coherence 
across the suite of programs administered.  
The SFRG actively monitored the management of risks to the recovery program and 
worked well as a coordination body but did not have clear authority over the nine 
departments, which each administered their own funding and programs. This meant it 
met some of its terms of reference in relation to monitoring and reporting, coordination 
and risk management but did not have power to perform a leadership role. Further, it 
missed opportunities to improve relief and recovery outcomes overall. The SFRG was 
slow to intervene to provide extra support to councils with lower capacity levels. 
Further, it did not make sure longer-term planning was undertaken and has not yet 
commissioned an overarching evaluation of the suite of relief and recovery programs 
and the broader recovery effort.  
At the municipal level the governance and administration arrangements worked well, 
but roles and responsibilities between state departments and municipalities were often 
unclear. 
A major input into how relief and recovery priorities are set is rapid impact assessment 
(RIA). Under RIA, data is collected in the 48 hours following an incident to help gauge 
the nature and extent of damage. Although RIA processes will always be imprecise, 
especially in flood situations where much of the damage is hidden or may develop over 
time, the model should be reviewed to address some clear shortcomings. 
The state's relief and recovery activity is focused on the short to medium term. While 
planning for implementation was sound overall, it is not clear how the state plans to 
achieve its long-term goals as there is little long-term planning for recovery in place.  
Issues impacting on implementation 
Recovery efforts were affected by interpretation and application of an NDRRA funding 
rule around betterment. As a general rule, funds can be used to restore or replace 
infrastructure to pre-disaster standard, but not to create something better than had 
previously existed. This created a problem for local government seeking to rebuild in a 
way that improved critical public infrastructure. It was, however, possible for local 
government to access Commonwealth funds if the proposed works were cost effective 
and would increase disaster resilience. Rules around accessing funding for betterment 
were not well understood by councils.  
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Negotiating the rules and application processes was testing for local government, 
especially at a time when it was dealing with many other challenges arising from the 
floods. Councils needed assistance from DTF to identify and process betterment 
proposals. Evidence shows that DTF's advice and support to councils on betterment 
was not sufficiently timely. However, this was partly due to the need for ongoing 
discussions with the Commonwealth to clarify the interpretation of the betterment 
funding principle. As a consequence of DTF not being able to provide timely advice, 
some potential local government proposals may not have gone forward and the state 
and local government may have foregone Commonwealth funding.  
A further implementation issue relates to local government capacity. Councils with a 
smaller rate base and problems attracting appropriately skilled and experienced staff 
faced greater challenges in supporting their communities and undertaking relief and 
recovery, especially major road and infrastructure repair works. Currently, as a result of 
these difficulties, 15 councils may not be able to expend their funding by the NDRRA 
cut-off date of 30 June 2013.  
There are also significant local government success stories, where councils worked 
together, with larger councils 'buddying' smaller ones or those outside the damage 
zone helping those coping with flood impacts. These collaborations were initiated 
without state department intervention. They illustrate the importance of social capital—
including pre-existing relationships and knowledge that can be shared—in emergency 
response at the local level. 
Community programs  
Communication about programs could have been better. There was no one source of 
authoritative advice on the relief and recovery programs and this added to the 
confusion created by multiple departments and programs. Of the 15 programs 
reviewed, when each is considered individually, overall planning was competently 
conducted and in many cases community access to funds was also reasonable.  
However, when considered as a set, differing eligibility rules, application rules and 
governance frameworks created confusion at the local community level. 
Short-term community relief and recovery programs were well implemented and 
generally well received by affected communities. Programs with more complex 
recovery objectives were less successful. In some cases, unnecessarily complex rules 
for access created problems that could have been avoided. For example, the 
disproportionate amount of application and approval processes under the Community 
Recovery Fund was neither helpful nor required for accountability purposes, and 
funding arrangements should have been streamlined.   
The aggregate administration burden created by 45 program and nine departmental 
administrators was also significant.  
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Meeting monitoring obligations  
Victoria has met its monitoring and reporting requirements under the National 
Partnership Agreement. Monitoring and reporting mechanisms were sufficiently 
adequate to oversight and manage the most pressing issues faced by local councils 
and communities. Of the 15 initiatives examined, funds acquittal, monitoring and 
reporting were timely and appropriate. 
Nevertheless, Victoria has not met its financial reporting obligations under the NDRRA 
as it is yet to provide an acquittal of funds spent in respect of the 2010–11 floods. 
The Commonwealth has advanced Victoria $500 million. At the time of the audit the 
Commonwealth is liable for approximately $350 million of the total estimated cost of 
the 2010–11 relief and recovery effort. This calculation is based on the cost sharing 
rules under the NDRRA. However, DTF has been given approval by the 
Commonwealth to use the unexpended balance of the $500 million advance for other 
eligible natural disasters. 
Recommendations 
Recommendations have been directed to departments or functional areas taking into 
account machinery-of-government changes, which come into effect on 1 July 2013, as 
well as the new emergency management arrangements arising from the December 
2012 White Paper on Victorian Emergency Management Reform. 
Two recommendations are directed to DPC, in the first instance, in light of its central 
agency role in overall emergency management. The December 2012 White Paper sets 
out changed organisational and administrative arrangements for the emergency 
management function within DOJ. 
DOJ will be establishing Emergency Management Victoria (EMV), which will be 
responsible for a range of emergency management functions including relief and 
recovery efforts. The audit contains two recommendations which should be directed to 
the EMV when it is set up and its responsibilities are made clear. In the interim, this 
audit has directed these recommendations to DPC in light of its role in providing 
high-level advice on security and emergency management policy issues and in 
undertaking strategic policy development projects.  
Due to the machinery-of-government changes: 
x one recommendation is directed towards Local Government Victoria, which will 
be a part of the new Department of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure 
x two recommendations are directed towards Regional Development Victoria, 
which will be transferred to the new Department of State Development, Business 
and Innovation. 
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Number Recommendation Page 
1. The Department of Justice should review the current model for 
rapid impact assessment to improve the quality of the 
information collected. 
26 
2. Local Government Victoria should lead the design and 
implementation of strategies to support councils to further 
develop social capital needed for recovery. 
39 
3. The Department of Human Services should develop an 
improved model for communication for future disasters that 
provides a single point of information and contact for disaster 
affected communities. 
39 
4. The Department of Premier and Cabinet should develop clear 
guidelines for departments in designing community disaster 
relief and recovery programs. 
53 
5. Rural Finance Corporation (Department of Treasury and 
Finance) and Regional Development Victoria should coordinate 
any future disaster relief and recovery programs for 
businesses. 
53 
6. Regional Development Victoria should implement the 
recommendations from the Department of Planning and 
Community Development's review of the Community Recovery 
Fund to improve the delivery of relief and recovery programs in 
the future. 
53 
7. The Department of Premier and Cabinet should lead: 
x the development of an evaluation framework, based on 
work undertaken to date by the Department of Human 
Services, to be used in assessing the impact of relief and 
recovery programs in the recent floods and in future 
disaster events 
x an evaluation of the impact of relief and recovery programs 
in the recent floods, using this framework. 
64 
 
Submissions and comments received 
In addition to progressive engagement during the course of the audit, in accordance 
with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report was provided to the 
departments of Premier and Cabinet, Treasury and Finance, Sustainability and 
Environment, Primary Industries, Justice, Business and Innovation, Human Services, 
and Planning and Community Development with a request for submissions or 
comments. Agency views have been considered in reaching our audit conclusions and 
are represented to the extent relevant and warranted in preparing this report. Their full 
section 16(3) submissions and comments are included in Appendix D. 
Relevant extracts from the report were also provided to the three councils where field 
work was conducted for this audit, in order to confirm the accuracy of information used.  
These were Loddon Shire Council, Campaspe Shire Council and Northern Grampians 
Shire Council. 
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1 Background 
1.1 The 2010–11 floods 
Between September 2010 and March 2011 Victoria experienced some of the most 
extensive and damaging floods in the state's history. These floods affected 70 of the 
79 Victorian local government areas, with 16 of them very severely impacted.  
Major damage was caused to whole communities, roads, rail networks, community 
infrastructure and the natural environment. Some communities were inundated several 
times, with repeat damage to homes, businesses and the agricultural sector.  
1.2 Commonwealth and state funding agreements  
Under the obligations and provisions of the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery 
Arrangements (NDRRA), the Commonwealth provides financial assistance to states 
and territories following disaster events. Victoria's mechanism for distributing NDRRA 
funds is through the Natural Disaster Financial Assistance program, which mirrors the 
rules and requirements of the NDRRA.  
In the past, the Commonwealth's share of relief and recovery costs was paid to the 
adversely affected state or territory after it had expended funds. However, in the  
2010–11 floods, the Commonwealth agreed to advance funding of $500 million, on the 
condition that a National Partnership Agreement (NPA) was signed which bound 
Victoria to certain actions. This was signed in May 2011. 
The NPA required Victoria to develop a Flood Recovery Work Plan (the Work Plan) in 
consultation with the Commonwealth. The Work Plan: 
x provided information on Victorian procurement policies 
x outlined a set of projects to assist with reconstruction and/or recovery 
x outlined project plans and strategies for projects over $5 million. 
The Victorian Work Plan targets the following priority areas:  
x reconstruction—supporting communities to rebuild major essential public assets  
x people and communities—assistance and services to support individuals and 
communities to manage their own recovery 
x the economy—support for business and employment in flood-affected areas. 
1.2.1 Funding allocations 
As at 31 January 2013, the total estimated cost for relief and recovery was 
$971 million. Figure 1A shows the distribution of the overall flood relief and recovery 
funding. 
Background 
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Allocation of flood relief and recovery funding 
NDRRA 
funding 
category Description 
Funding 
($ million) 
A   Emergency assistance given to individuals to alleviate 
personal hardship or distress 
35 
B  Restoration or replacement of essential public assets 778 
C  Community recovery package to support communities, 
small businesses and primary producers 
86 
D  Exceptional circumstances as determined by the state 
and Commonwealth governments 
1 
State funded Relief and recovery of communities and local economies 
to increase community resilience in future disasters 
71 
Total  971 
Note: The NDRRA categories are subject to a cost-sharing arrangement between the state and 
Commonwealth governments. The state-funded category is wholly state funded. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office analysis of departmental documentation 
1.2.2 Insurance 
Each Victorian department has disaster insurance, and, as at 31 January 2013, 
approximately $70 million has been reimbursed from insurance claims for the 
restoration or replacement of essential public assets. 
A review by the Commonwealth of state and territory insurance arrangements under 
the NDRRA Determination in September 2012 determined that, overall, when 
‘…assessed against the qualitative benchmark, Victoria has insurance arrangements 
that are appropriate, cost effective and that meet the obligations to minimise the 
financial exposure of taxpayers at both levels of government’. 
1.3 Related audits and reviews 
1.3.1 Commonwealth-level audits and reviews 
Australian National Audit Office 
The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) conducted three audits on key aspects of 
the NPAs signed with Victoria and Queensland for the 2010–11 floods. They included: 
x separate audits of Victoria and Queensland to assess the effectiveness of the 
Australian Government Reconstruction Inspectorate (the Inspectorate), in 
providing assurance that value for money is being achieved in recovery and 
reconstruction in Victoria, and in reconstruction in Queensland  
x assessing the extent to which the Work Plans required were prepared, and 
appropriate monitoring and reports were provided in accordance with the NPA.  
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The Australian Government Reconstruction Inspectorate 
Each month, Victoria reports to the Inspectorate on the progress of recovery and 
reconstruction. As at the end of December 2012, no value for money reviews had been 
completed for Victorian projects, which means that the Inspectorate is currently unable 
to assure the Commonwealth that value for money is being achieved.  
The ANAO's audit report on the Inspectorate's conduct of value for money reviews 
found that a delay in finalising an operating protocol between the Commonwealth and 
Victoria has affected the Inspectorate's ability to scrutinise projects. The protocol was 
finalised in August 2012, and endorsed by Victoria in December 2012.  
Victoria has requested an extension to the NDRRA funding period to 2013–14. It is 
likely that this will require Victoria's agreement to allow increased oversight by the 
Inspectorate, particularly for projects with a value greater than $5 million which, under 
the NPA, are subject to a value for money review.    
1.3.2 State-level reviews 
The 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission and the Review of the 2010–11 Flood 
Warning and Response (the Comrie Review) have identified that some of the current 
emergency management structures in Victoria are ineffective. While much of the 
Comrie Review is focused on flood warnings and the emergency response, it also 
examined and made recommendations on clean-up, recovery and community 
resilience. 
In parallel to this audit, the government has been developing reforms of how it 
manages emergencies. In December 2012, the government's White Paper on Victorian 
Emergency Management Reform, proposed changes in emergency management 
governance and organisation design to address a range of issues including 
coordination of relief and recovery in communities, roles of key stakeholders and 
streamlining of governance arrangements. This audit identified similar issues. 
1.4 Governance arrangements 
The governance structure of various Commonwealth and state committees established 
after the 2010–11 flood events is shown in Figure 1B.  
A key committee in this high-level governance structure was the Secretaries’ Flood 
Recovery Group (SFRG), which liaised with the Commonwealth and was responsible 
for leading and coordinating the reconstruction and recovery efforts across state 
departments. 
SFRG membership included all departmental secretaries, Victoria Police, VicRoads 
and the Emergency Services Commissioner. It was co-chaired by the secretaries of the 
(then) Department of Primary Industries (DPI) and the Department of Human Services 
(DHS). 
Background 
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In addition to strategic leadership and coordination, the SFRG was to identify issues 
and policy responses, assess progress and evaluate the effectiveness of recovery 
initiatives.  
The SFRG reported to the Security and Emergencies Committee (SEC) of Cabinet 
which, together with the Budget and Expenditure Review Committee, approved funding 
on advice from the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF), Department of Premier 
and Cabinet (DPC) and SFRG.  
The SEC gave direction, developed policy and had oversight of the implementation of 
strategies and programs affecting security and emergency management issues. 
  Figure 1B
2010–11 flood recovery governance structure 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on SFRG documentation. 
Each department played a role in relief and recovery. Most initiatives were 
administered through DTF, DHS, the (former) Department of Planning and Community 
Development (DPCD), (former) DPI and the (former) Department of Sustainability and 
Environment (DSE). The roles and key responsibilities of each department are listed in 
Figure 1C. 
  
Australian Government 
Reconstruction 
Inspectorate 
(Commonwealth)
Australian National Audit 
Office 
(Commonwealth)
Victorian 
Auditor-General’s Office
(Victoria)
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  Figure 1C
Departmental responsibilities 
x DPC—providing policy direction and advice to government and a lead role in 
intergovernmental communication and reporting. 
x DTF—determining the overall damage—relief, reconstruction and recovery—estimate 
for the state and subsequent Commonwealth contribution according to NDRRA rules. 
Administration of funding programs for local government and for affected communities 
through Rural Finance Corporation.  
x DHS—coordinating regional and state-level relief and recovery in line with its role under 
the Emergency Management Manual Victoria (EMMV), including coordinating provision 
of personal support—psychosocial and first aid—interim accommodation, and provision 
of DHS administered financial assistance payments.  
x Department of Health (DH)—administers health functions in line with the EMMV such 
as the provision of public health advice and reconstruction of health facilities.  
x DPI—responsible for the initial damage assessment of farm holdings and animal welfare 
support services. DPI also coordinated whole-of-government reporting for the state’s 
flood relief and recovery initiatives and reported this to SFRG and the Commonwealth.  
x DPCD—administering funding for initiatives, including resources to assist local councils 
in flood recovery, local government clean-up and community recovery and restoration of 
community infrastructure.    
x DSE—funding the recovery effort for community infrastructure on Crown land. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
1.5 The relief and recovery quadrant 
Disaster relief and recovery programs are commonly delivered under a quadrant of 
themes: 
x Social—which covers people, health and community 
x Economic—which includes businesses, agriculture and other primary industries 
x Natural environment—includes parks and natural disaster warning systems 
x Built environment—includes community assets, roads, bridges and other 
infrastructure. 
There were 45 programs, including 40 across these four areas and a further five 
crossing quadrants. Figure 1D shows where each of these programs fit into these 
themes. 
The five programs implemented by the SFRG which operated across all four themes 
were the: 
x flood recovery team 
x emergency service organisation response and recovery costs 
x Victorian state emergency service response and recovery costs 
x whole-of-government flood recovery team  
x whole-of-government reporting.  
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  Figure 1D
Relief and recovery activities by theme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: RFC denotes Rural Finance Corporation and CMA denotes Catchment Management Authority.  
Note: The initiatives in bold are examined in this audit.  
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from the May 2011 Flood Recovery Work Plan. 
While several reviews and audits have examined various aspects of flood response—
see Section 1.3—the area of community relief and recovery has not been substantially 
reviewed or audited. This audit examined 15 community-focused initiatives of the 
45 relief and recovery programs. These 15 initiatives were delivered by five state 
government departments to help flood-affected local councils, businesses, 
communities and individuals, as shown in Figure 1E. 
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  Figure 1E
Community relief and recovery programs 
 
Program 
Cost 
($ mil) Description 
Department of Human Services 
1 Interim Accommodation Plan 2.2 Temporary accommodation for individuals or families whose 
home was damaged.  
2 Personal Hardship Grants 20.1 Payments to individuals to reduce hardship.  
3 Psychosocial Recovery 4.7 Staff for counselling, case work support and community 
forums. 
Department of Planning and Community Development 
4 Business Flood Recovery 
Fund 
10.0 Grants to medium and large businesses to stimulate job 
creation and promote economic development.  
5 Community Recovery Fund 4.0 Grants to councils and community organisations to restore 
social networks and rebuild community facilities.  
6 Local Government Clean Up 
Fund 
5.0 For councils for initial clean-up and repair. 
7 Flood Recovery Officers 2.1 Grants to 32 councils to employ 19 flood recovery officers. 
8a Flood Recovery Community 
Infrastructure Fund (DPCD 
component) 
8.0 For councils and not-for-profit community organisations for 
repair and replacement of community infrastructure. 
Department of Sustainability and Environment 
8b Flood Recovery Community 
Infrastructure Fund (DSE 
component) 
22.0 Funds to Crown land reserve committees of management 
for repair and replacement of community infrastructure. 
Department of Primary Industries 
9 Apprenticeship Retention 
Program 
1.0 Grants to businesses to support the retention of 
apprentices.  
10 Rural Coordination Officers 0.5 Funding for nine rural coordination officers for a 6-month 
period to respond to rural farm issues. 
11 Rural Financial Counsellors 3.4 Additional senior rural financial counsellor coordinators to 
assist primary producers and small rural businesses. 
12 Flood Response and 
Recovery (agriculture) 
3.6 Services to the agricultural sector to rebuild and recover. 
Department of Treasury and Finance - Rural Finance Corporation 
12 Clean-Up and Restoration 
Grants 
82.0 Grants up to $25 000 available to primary producers, small 
businesses and not-for-profit organisations for clean-up, 
removal of debris and business restoration.  
14 Exceptional Disaster 
Assistance 
1.4 Grant and loan packages designed to assist primary 
producers and small to medium businesses essential to key 
economic supply chains and regional employment. 
15 Concessional Loans 6.0 Loans up to $200 000 to eligible primary producers, small 
businesses and not-for-profit organisations.  
 Total 176.0  
Note: The total of $176 million for the 15 community-focused programs is approximately 18 per cent of the total 
estimated cost of $971 million, which includes a $70 million insurance offset. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from departmental documentation. 
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1.6 Most affected local government areas  
Six geographic areas were severely affected and require sustained and long-term 
recovery planning: 
x Carisbrook township—Central Goldfields Shire 
x Mildura—Mildura Rural City Council 
x Creswick township—Hepburn Shire 
x Charlton—Buloke Shire 
x Grampians—including Halls Gap and Grampians National Park—Northern 
Grampians Shire 
x Gannawarra/Loddon Shires—covers Gannawarra, Loddon, Campaspe, Swan 
Hill and Buloke (excluding Charlton) shires. 
  Figure 1F
Flood-affected areas 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on the Secretaries’ Flood Recovery Group Work Plan. 
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This audit examined the flood relief and recovery activities at the Shires of Campaspe, 
Loddon and Northern Grampians. These councils and their communities were also 
dealing with more than a decade of drought, locust plagues and bushfire events prior 
to experiencing major flooding from September 2010 to March 2011. 
They all received Commonwealth and state funding to assist with reconstruction and 
recovery. 
1.7 Audit objective and scope 
The audit assessed the effectiveness and efficiency of the state’s relief and recovery 
arrangements during and after the 2010–11 floods.  
To address this objective, the audit examined the: 
x planning processes used to determine relief and recovery actions and priorities 
x governance structures and arrangements for relief and recovery initiatives 
x implementation and monitoring of those actions once committed 
x evaluation of relief and recovery actions. 
This audit focused on the community relief and recovery activities of: 
x DPC and its role in intergovernmental communication and reporting 
x DTF as administrator of the majority of Commonwealth and state funding  
x DPI and DHS as co-chairs of the SFRG and administrators of several relief and 
recovery initiatives and associated funding 
x DSE and DPCD as administrators of several relief and recovery initiatives and 
associated funding. 
The audit focused on categories A and C of assistance under the NDRRA—as 
explained in Figure 1A. 
Emergency response aspects of the flood disasters were not examined. 
In April 2013, the Premier announced a range of machinery of government changes to 
take full effect from 1 July 2013. These will dissolve the Department of Planning and 
Community Development and create the new Department of Transport, Planning and 
Local Infrastructure (DTPLI) and the new Department of State Development, Business 
and Innovation (DSDBI).  
In light of these changes and where certain functions are transferring to new 
departments, certain recommendations have been directed to the business units 
Regional Development Victoria and Local Government Victoria. The recommendations 
will become the responsibility of DTPLI and DSDBI when the business units are 
transferred on 1 July 2013. 
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One recommendation is directed to the Department of Justice (DOJ) which has 
responsibility for rapid impact assessment. Two recommendations are directed to DPC 
in the first instance in light of its role in overall emergency management. It is 
anticipated that these recommendations will be redirected to DOJ once it establishes 
new emergency management arrangements arising from the government's White 
Paper on Victorian Emergency Management Reform.   
The audit was conducted in accordance with section 15 of the Audit Act 1994 and 
Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards. Pursuant to section 20(3) of the Audit 
Act 1994, unless otherwise indicated, any persons named in this report are not the 
subject of adverse comment or opinion. 
The cost of the audit was $523 000. 
1.8 Structure of the report 
This report is structured as follows: 
x Part 2 examines the state's governance and planning for flood disaster relief and 
recovery. 
x Part 3 explores overarching issues in the implementation of relief and recovery 
initiatives.  
x Part 4 assesses the state's delivery of 15 community relief and recovery 
programs. 
x Part 5 examines the related monitoring and evaluation activities. 
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2 Governance and planning  
At a glance 
Background 
The success of disaster relief and recovery efforts relies heavily on a well-defined 
governance structure, clear leadership authority and well-defined agency roles and 
responsibilities. Good planning for implementation is also crucial. 
Conclusion 
The governance model used to manage flood relief had serious flaws. Despite being 
expected to lead the recovery, in reality the Secretaries' Flood Recovery Group 
(SFRG) only had a coordination role. The number of committees at the state, regional 
and local level created a complex and unwieldy structure. The state's relief and 
recovery activity focused on the short to medium term and there is little evidence of 
longer-term planning required to effect full recovery. A reformed governance model has 
now been developed and is detailed in a recent White Paper on Emergency 
Management Reform. 
Findings 
x Funding was administered separately by each of the nine departments—all had 
different processes and points of contact. 
x The governance model of using existing departmental structures and 
arrangements did not encourage collaboration or coherence across the suite of 
programs. 
x The SFRG actively monitored the management of risks to the recovery program. 
x At the municipal level, governance arrangements worked well, but roles and 
responsibilities between state departments and municipalities were often unclear.  
x The state's relief and recovery activity focused on the short to medium term and it 
is not clear how it plans to achieve its long-term recovery goals. 
x The rapid impact assessment could have been better implemented in order to 
provide more accurate information to shape relief and recovery priorities. 
Recommendation 
x The Department of Justice should review the current model for rapid impact 
assessment to improve the quality of the information collected. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Disaster relief and recovery is complex because it involves multiple players operating 
as service providers. 
Widespread disasters like the 2010–11 floods, which affected numerous areas across 
Victoria, also involved multiple tiers of government, including head office and regional 
staff of state departments, as well as local government and non-government 
organisations such as the Salvation Army and Red Cross. 
The 2010–11 floods were not one event, but a serious of overlapping events. Flood 
waters took time to dissipate in many areas and in some cases heavy rains struck 
again before the recovery efforts from previous incidents were completed. The 
leadership and logistics tasks in this context were very challenging.  
In the face of this challenge, the foundations of a strong governance structure and 
good planning needed to be sound, for relief and recovery to be responsive to 
community needs and efficiently delivered. 
An appropriate governance structure should have been established with clear 
leadership authority and all necessary relationships defined. Community distress and 
uncertainty faced by affected communities made good governance even more critical.  
The 2007 Australian Public Service Commissioner's report Building Better Governance 
sets out the following principles that need to be considered when establishing 
governance arrangements: 
x strong leadership, culture and communication 
x appropriate governance committee structures 
x clear accountability mechanisms 
x working effectively across organisational boundaries 
x stakeholder relationships 
x comprehensive risk management, compliance and assurance systems 
x strategic planning and performance monitoring.  
This Part examines how the central governance model worked and performed in terms 
of the principles outlined above. It also describes governance arrangements at the 
regional and local level and examines planning of priority initiatives for financial 
assistance and support. 
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2.2 Conclusion 
Governance  
Although a whole-of-government committee structure was established with identified 
roles and responsibilities, this governance model had serious flaws in practice. 
Funding was administered separately by nine of the 10 departments involved, which 
meant that the Secretaries' Flood Recovery Group (SFRG) had a coordination role, 
rather than a leadership role, focusing on information exchange and integrating actions 
rather than on directing recovery efforts.   
The nine departments administering funding all had different processes, program rules 
and points of contact. This did not encourage collaboration or a coherent logic across 
the suite of programs.     
The number of committees at a state, regional and local level created a complex and 
unwieldy structure, which the affected communities found hard to understand. 
As the SFRG's authority to lead, intervene and change what departments were doing 
was constrained, some important issues requiring action were not addressed. These 
included the need to better support some councils which were struggling to meet all 
the demands placed on them, and the articulation of long-term plans.   
Despite the limitations of the model, the SFRG did actively monitor and manage the 
risks to the relief and recovery program, as required under its terms of reference. 
Planning 
The main implementation planning was in the form of a budget proposal to government 
prepared by the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) and based on bids 
prepared by each department.  
This work gave a sound basis to the subsequent roll-out of programs and more 
detailed planning which occurred at the regional and local level. A key input to this 
proposal was rapid impact assessment (RIA) information. However, the RIA model 
used should be improved to provide better information in future emergency events.  
The state's relief and recovery activity was too focused on the short to medium term 
and there is little evidence of the longer-term planning required to effect full recovery. 
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2.3 Governance arrangements 
2.3.1 The central governance model 
In January 2011, a Flood Recovery Task Force was established by the Premier as the 
initial governance structure in response to the floods. However, the taskforce quickly 
determined that the scale and enormity of the floods required a different governance 
structure and arrangements to those put in place for the late 2010 floods. An improved 
governance structure was expected to deliver a cohesive and comprehensive 
whole-of-government response to the reconstruction and recovery efforts.  
Three governance model options were considered: 
x a stand-alone authority, similar to the Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and 
Recovery Authority set up after the 2009 Black Saturday fires 
x an existing authority to be responsible for key elements of the program and to 
have a broad coordination role across others 
x a coordinated approach with a strong emphasis on cross-agency cooperation, 
using existing departments and agencies, with oversight by an inter-departmental 
committee.  
The third model was adopted and in late March 2011, the Secretary of the Department 
of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) informed departments of the changed governance 
structure and arrangements.  
The new arrangements were based on an SFRG with cross-agency teams covering 
the areas of emergency, economic and environmental recovery reporting directly to it. 
The Secretaries' Flood Recovery Group 
Membership of the SFRG included all departmental secretaries, Victoria Police, 
VicRoads and the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner (OESC). It was 
co-chaired by the Secretaries of the Department of Human Services (DHS) and the 
Department of Primary industries (DPI) and was tasked with: 
x providing strategic leadership  
x coordinating the work of government departments 
x identifying issues and policy responses 
x assessing progress and evaluating the effectiveness of recovery initiatives.  
The terms of reference for the SFRG are at Appendix A. 
The harnessing of existing departmental structures and established arrangements was 
expected to effectively and efficiently coordinate recovery efforts across the various 
departments involved in service delivery.  
The governance model, including links to regional and local committees, is shown in 
Figure 2A. 
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  Figure 2A
Governance structure 2010–11 flood relief and recovery 
Source:  Victorian Auditor-General's Office from departmental documents. 
Flood recovery groups reporting to the SFRG 
The approved structure set up three groups reporting to the SFRG:  
x A Flood Economic and Environmental Recovery Team, reporting to the secretary 
of DPI, focused on planning and implementing medium- and longer-term 
economic and environmental issues.  
x A Flood Emergency and Recovery Team, reporting to the secretary of DHS, 
focused on assistance to affected households and communities, and reporting on 
the overall progress of the flood recovery.  
x A Flood Recovery Coordination Group, which provided a forum for the leaders of 
the two recovery teams described above, along with department recovery 
leaders, to further coordinate and collaborate on recovery. 
While these groups regularly communicated, meetings occurred on an as needs basis.  
The SFRG executive comprised senior departmental officers who prepared and 
coordinated documentation for consideration at SFRG meetings.  
In practice, the same senior departmental officers attended the SFRG and the SFRG 
executive negating the need for three additional flood recovery groups. 
DBI
Flood Emergency Recovery Team
Budget  and Expenditure Review
Committee (Cabinet)
Security and Emergencies
Committee (Cabinet)
DH DEECDDHSDPI DSE DPCDDTF DoJ
Secretaries Flood Recovery Group
Chaired by Secretaries of DPI and DHS
OESC VicRoadsDPCVicPol
Flood Recovery Coordination Group
Flood Economic and Environmental Team
Regional Recovery Committees
(Chaired by DHS)
Local Government  Recovery
Committees
Local Community Recovery
Committees
(not in all affected communities)
Local Government Councillors
included regional office representatives from DPI, DPCD, DHS,
DSE, DBI, VicRoads, VicPol, and NGOs such as Red Cross
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2.3.2 Regional-level administration 
Pre-existing regional structures were used by DHS, the Department of Planning and 
Community Development, the Department of Sustainability and Environment and DPI 
to administer and deliver programs. Generally, departments with a regional presence 
had pre-established relationships with local councils which were effective and helpful 
for relief and recovery activity. 
Regional recovery committees—with representatives from departments and local 
government and chaired by the DHS Regional Recovery Manager—met regularly to 
oversee recovery coordination across the regions. They also assessed loss and 
damage, implemented recovery initiatives—including funding programs approved by 
government—and monitored regional progress. 
As DTF had no regional presence, councils worked with DTF directly in its role as 
funding administrator for roads and bridges repair and the Natural Disaster Relief and 
Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA) requirements.  
2.3.3 Local council-level administration 
At a municipal level, flood recovery committees were quickly established to respond to 
immediate relief and recovery efforts. These were usually chaired by the Mayor and 
included key stakeholders from council, and regional representatives from state 
departments and not-for-profit organisations such as the Red Cross, Salvation Army 
and the Victorian Council of Churches. 
These committees were required to develop and implement flood recovery action plans 
to address immediate, short- and medium-term relief and recovery needs.  
2.3.4 Assessment of the SFRG governance model  
The history of emergency management in Victoria has been marred by a siloed 
approach. Although the multiple services and stakeholders each make an important 
contribution, they could make a more powerful contribution had they worked more 
cohesively.  
This fragmented approach has been noted in various policy papers and reviews, 
including the Review of the 2010–11 Flood Warnings and Response prepared by Neil 
Comrie AO, APM (the Comrie Review), which also observed a ‘strategic void’ in 
Victoria’s emergency management arrangements.   
The government’s White Paper on Victorian Emergency Management Reform (the 
White Paper) notes that ‘Current governance structures reinforce a siloed approach to 
emergency management’, and has proposed streamlined governance arrangements 
under one peak body, the State Crisis and Resilience Council. 
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These documents are fairly recent, however, the siloed approach has featured in 
government policy papers and in debate about emergency management for a number 
of years. Despite this, the SFRG model perpetuated a number of the inherent flaws 
inherited from the past approaches to emergency management: 
x it did not serve as one point of clear authority, so its leadership capacity was 
constrained 
x it did not facilitate collaboration but maintained existing silos. 
Leadership versus coordination 
The difference between leadership and coordination is important to assessing how the 
SFRG operated. In this context, leadership is defined as steering a course to meet 
strategic and operational objectives, knowing when to act, acting promptly, and 
directing what action should be taken and by whom.  
In contrast, coordination seeks to achieve integration or synchronisation of actions—in 
this case, the efforts of the nine departments involved in relief and recovery 
programs—and to share information in order to achieve common goals.   
Under the governance model used for floods recovery, each department led its own 
sphere of activity leaving the SFRG with a role of coordination. The coordination task 
was significant, given the large number of departmental players, the complex suite of 
relief and recovery programs and the overlapping nature of flood events.  
Although records of deliberations and decision-making show that the SFRG acquitted 
this coordination role well, there is little evidence of it leading relief and recovery efforts 
as required under its terms of reference. 
Records of SFRG meetings show that there were issues central to the effectiveness of 
recovery efforts which were considered on multiple occasions but where responsive 
action should have been more prompt.  
One of the most significant ongoing issues was the capacity of certain councils to plan 
for and manage the spending of NDRRA allocations. It was clear from early meetings 
of the SFRG in 2011 that certain councils were struggling but the SFRG failed to act: 
x In April 2011, issues regarding council capacity to recover were discussed at the 
SFRG meeting with a decision made to: 
x brief regional contacts 
x identify local government areas (LGA) which need assistance appointing a 
Rural Coordination Officer 
x produce a list of councils who had not yet submitted claims to facilitate 
follow-up. 
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x In August 2011, two separate assessments of council recovery capacity were 
carried out by Local Government Victoria (LGV) and Regional Development 
Victoria (RDV). LGV completed a risk assessment of 50 flood-affected LGAs and 
categorised them into three risk categories—Assist, Monitor, and Ok. Seven 
LGAs were identified as Assist and four as Monitor. RDV conducted a survey of 
29 flood-affected LGAs based on issues raised by the Commonwealth 
Inspectorate relating to flood recovery and the use of contractors. 
x In September 2011, the SFRG considered a combined proposal by RDV and 
LGV to assist seven LGAs by funding each with a Flood Recovery Project 
Manager using re-prioritised flood funding. The SFRG did not support the 
provision of funding to councils for project managers. 
x The SFRG decision in October 2011 was to continue monitoring the councils and 
act on any issues that arose. This monitoring was then merged with the monthly 
web portal reporting. The SFRG also provided more information and sent 
members from the SFRG executive out to talk to councils. 
x In March 2012, the SFRG received a report that nine of 17 affected councils’ 
current expenditure was less than 50 per cent of the total estimated damage bill.   
x At the SFRG meeting on 1 June 2012, preliminary findings from meetings with 
flood-affected councils revealed that nine councils needed more time for 
reconstruction.   
The varying capacity of local councils to meet demands placed on them is an ongoing 
and difficult issue. In the case of the floods, the size and complexity of repair and 
rebuilding significantly impacted this capacity. However, there was a lack of strong 
leadership to take action to support those councils with the most significant challenges. 
DTF advised that 15 councils will be unable to complete their flood repairs by 
30 June 2013 and have requested an extension to the allowable time period. 
There are other examples where stronger leadership by the SFRG would have 
benefited relief and recovery. These relate to longer-term planning for recovery, and 
evaluation.  
Victoria set out its priorities for action under the Flood Recovery Work Plan (the Work 
Plan) which was developed as a requirement for funding from the Commonwealth 
under the National Partnership Agreement. 
The Work Plan identifies longer-term recovery as a period greater than two years. 
The role of the SFRG included recommending to government any medium- and 
longer-term policy initiatives to facilitate flood recovery for business, communities and 
the environment.  
Planning for longer-term recovery was poor. Departments did not develop longer-term 
plans or strategic goals so the focus, effort and energy for this final but important part 
of the recovery task has dissipated. SFRG should have played a much stronger role in 
requiring plans, setting clear goals and monitoring action to achieve these goals. 
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A further important area of leadership relates to evaluation. The SFRG was 
responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of flood recovery initiatives. As set out in 
Part 5 of this report, there was no overarching evaluation of the relief and recovery 
effort.  
This represents poor accountability for expenditure and means that Victoria has not 
captured lessons learnt from the floods experience to improve emergency 
management for future situations. This is a lost opportunity.  
It is also concerning that, in light of the new emergency management architecture to be 
introduced in Victoria, valuable lessons learnt will not be available to use in the 
redesign work which is underway.  
Authority 
Another flaw in the SFRG’s authority is that its membership was intended to be 
departmental secretaries, senior Victoria Police officers and the Emergency Services 
Commissioner. This level of authority was considered necessary to lead efforts, with 
the required authority and provide appropriate advice to the Cabinet and ministers.  
However, the audit noted a pattern of devolved responsibility with member secretaries 
delegating their responsibility to subordinate officers. Analysis of attendance over the 
8 March 2011 to 2 October 2012 period shows that: 
x five secretaries never attended any meeting 
x the most secretaries at a meeting was five, which only occurred once just after 
the group commenced 
x less than one month after the SFRG was established, the co-chair secretaries—
DHS and DPI were the only two departmental secretaries present 
x in the second half of this period, secretaries who were responsible for chairing 
increasingly delegated this responsibility to their staff.  
Collaboration 
Collaboration relates to sharing responsibility for decision-making and in this context 
applies to planning, program and service design, and delivery and evaluation. 
As noted above, the SFRG served to coordinate activity. However, the relief and 
recovery effort should have been collaborative not just coordinated. This would have 
created better links between programs and may have addressed some of the 
fragmentation of the overall relief and recovery effort which, as set out in Part 4, 
created significant confusion among local councils and affected communities.  
Management of risk 
Effective risk management is an important element of governance and contributes to 
the achievement of objectives. Risk management took on even greater significance 
during flood recovery given the breadth and complexity of the process which involved 
multiple tiers of government, stakeholders, programs and initiatives.  
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A key function of the SFRG under its terms of reference was to ‘establish a risk 
management strategy for flood recovery to inform current and future actions’. 
The risks identified in the Whole-of-Victorian-Government (WoVG) Risk Assessment 
were relevant and comprehensive in terms of key broad risks facing the flood recovery 
process. There was a clear obligation for departments to identify and manage 
operational and implementation risks associated with the delivery of initiatives under 
their control. However, it was not developed until August 2011, nearly five months after 
the 2011 floods.  
In March 2011, the SFRG was provided with a Flood Recovery Consolidated Strategic 
Risk Management Matrix. This matrix identified risks on a department by department 
basis but not all departments were represented, and it did not provide a 
comprehensive risk assessment. It also lacked mitigation strategies for some risks, 
and responsibility for implementing mitigation strategies was not always clear. 
The Work Plan showed that Victoria had established an electronic risk register for the 
recovery process. But this was not the case.  
The only overarching listing or register of risks was the WoVG Risk Assessment which 
was not developed until August 2011. Despite this issue, between March 2011 and 
August 2011, there is evidence that the SFRG actively monitored the management of 
risks to the recovery program.  
SFRG was provided with regular reports on key issues and risks, including emerging 
issues, which enabled it to monitor mitigation action on previously unidentified risks as 
they arose. In this way the SFRG’s oversight of risk management extended beyond a 
‘set and forget’ approach where monitoring only occurred on a set of previously 
identified risks. 
This risk reporting and monitoring was undertaken using reports on recovery streams 
of activity and place-based reports rather than as a separate exercise with specific 
reporting against a formalised risk management strategy document. Although the 
approach adopted by the SFRG during this period was not fully consistent with the 
commitments provided in the Work Plan, it was an adequate and practical response to 
emerging issues and challenges.  
The approach matured and after August 2011, the SFRG monitored risks using both its 
regular progress reports and the WoVG Risk Assessment document. The SFRG also 
established separate agenda items for key risks such as local government capacity to 
undertake reconstruction works and the interpretation of Commonwealth funding 
provisions on asset betterment. 
Specific commentary on the effectiveness of mitigation actions in relation to key risks 
identified in the WoVG Risk Assessment document is provided in Part 3 of this report.  
In summary, while the SFRG actively identified risks and obtained regular reports on 
progress in dealing with them, the findings of this audit and other reviews on some key 
risks, such as local government capacity and communication with key stakeholders, 
indicate that mitigation activity was not fully effective in these areas. 
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Effectiveness against good governance principles 
The performance of the SFRG model against the Australian Public Service 
Commissioner’s good governance principles is summarised in Figure 2B. 
  Figure 2B
Effectiveness of the SFRG model against good governance principles 
Good 
governance 
principle 
Assessment of 
SFRG model Comment 
Strong leadership No Model allowed coordination rather than leadership 
Appropriate 
governance 
committee 
structures 
In part Committees set up by the SFRG as direct reports 
were appropriate, but the overall network of 40 
state, regional and local committees was 
confusing 
Clear 
accountability 
In part Accountability upwards to Commonwealth for 
NDRRA funds and to government through two 
Cabinet committees led to problematic 
accountability by departments  
Working 
effectively across 
organisational 
boundaries 
No The model allowed a siloed approach by 
departments  
Stakeholder 
relationships 
 
In part  SFRG taskforce met with affected communities in 
2012. The model facilitated strong links with 
departmental head office staff but there was 
confusion among other players about roles and 
responsibilities 
Comprehensive 
risk management 
In part SFRG was alert to new and emerging risks. Its 
response was adequate and practical although 
mitigation activity was not fully effective  
Strategic 
planning, 
performance 
monitoring  
 
In part Plans were developed (see Section 2.4) and key 
activity monitored but there was no overall 
evaluation or emphasis on evaluation of individual 
programs. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
2.3.5 Effectiveness of regional and local administration 
arrangements 
Regional governance and administration arrangements and local level arrangements 
appear to have worked fairly smoothly, when considered in their own right.   
Regional committees worked mainly as information sharing bodies. There was some 
frustration by local government at the need to sit on multiple committees with the 
activity of regional forums not necessarily linked to concrete actions. However in a 
complex and changing emergency context, the sharing of information was an important 
aspect of the overall relief and recovery effort, even if its links to outcomes on the 
ground was not so obvious. 
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As DTF does not have a regional presence, local government staff had to deal directly 
with Melbourne-based head office staff. This model worked in varied ways across the 
three visited councils.  
Some council staff were frustrated at the lack of clarity regarding NDRRA funding 
rules, stating that responses to questions were slow and delayed recovery works. 
Others found DTF to be very supportive in determining an approach to meeting the 
NDRRA criteria. 
At a municipal level, Flood Recovery Committees were quickly established with a clear 
mandate and relevant appropriate authority, as they were generally chaired by the 
Mayor. They also included appropriate stakeholders from council, regional 
representatives from state departments and not-for-profit organisations. Engagement 
by stakeholders was very positive. 
The Municipal Flood Recovery Committees at all visited councils developed and 
implemented flood recovery action plans which ensured there was a clear blueprint for 
action. 
When regional and local administration arrangements are considered independently, 
they each appear reasonable. However, the picture is different when all arrangements 
are viewed collectively. The numerous committees operating at a state, regional and 
municipal level involving many stakeholders created a complex and unwieldy structure. 
The White Paper notes that there were more than 40 committees, sub committees and 
working groups identified in the Comrie Review. The multiplicity of committees is one 
issue that the new governance arrangements set out in the White Paper seeks to 
address.  
Local government authorities were important players in informing and delivering 
services to their communities. However, overall effectiveness of relief and recovery 
efforts was weakened by a lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities between state 
departments and municipalities. At the community level, audit field work found that 
many were confused about the relief and recovery role of local government and that of 
the various government departments. 
Despite this, arrangements at the local level generally worked effectively due to 
pre-existing relationships and councils’ motivation to quickly address problems caused 
by the floods.  
However, efforts were not uniformly effective in every local government area and the 
issue of local government capacity and impacts on relief and recovery efforts is 
discussed in Part 3 of this report.  
Future governance arrangements 
The changed arrangements proposed in the White Paper are designed to rectify past 
problems. It will be important that the new State Crisis and Resilience Council, chaired 
by the Secretary of DPC, is informed by appropriate governance principles while the 
detail of the Council’s operational design is developed further. 
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2.4 Implementation planning  
2.4.1 The importance of good planning  
Good planning is essential in emergency events and needs to resist pressures from 
communities to move too rapidly to service delivery without considering how this is 
done in the most rational and efficient way to get the best results.  
Best practice planning incorporates a clear high level or statewide plan, which is used 
to develop more detailed operational plans at the departmental and local levels.  
2.4.2 Assessing the impact of the damage 
The Emergency Management Manual Victoria (EMMV) prepared by the Department of 
Justice contains policy and planning documents for emergency management in 
Victoria, and provides details about the roles different organisations play in emergency 
management. The EMMV requires that: 
x the control agency has overall responsibility for instigating and managing the RIA 
process 
x RIAs are carried out in a timely manner  
x all agencies involved in the emergency may be tasked to collect, confirm and 
exchange relevant information. 
The OESC in the Department of Justice is responsible for the RIA model used. The 
objective of the RIA is to capture the nature and scale of the impact on people, 
community infrastructure, the economy, and natural and built environments during the 
initial 48 hours of an emergency.  
The more quickly and comprehensively that information is collected, the sooner 
priorities for relief and recovery activities can be informed and appropriate resources 
provided. 
The OESC was responsible for the RIA report using data collected by response 
agencies on the ground—including the State Emergency Service, Victoria Police and 
the fire services, as well as the Army.  
Impact assessment data collected from 21 to 24 January 2011 was used to inform the 
report presented to the Flood Recovery Task Force on 25 January 2011. DPI provided 
a high level report on damage to the agricultural sector.  
Significant impacts and issues affecting the municipalities, communities, farms and 
people shown DPI’s report are shown in Figure 2C.  
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  Figure 2C
Rapid impact assessment – significant impacts and issues 
The assessment in January 2011 identified the number, location and immediate impact on: 
x Infrastructure 
x roads, bridges and railway lines closed, inaccessible or washed away 
x inundated public facilities and residential properties 
x some 1 800 properties affected 
x Essential services 
x including train services, power, telecommunications 
x water supply and sewer networks 
x People 
x residents—evacuation, inundation, isolation 
x noted 24 municipalities and 75 townships affected 
x noted 4 500 people affected 
x Agricultural sector 
x stock losses and potential health issues for stock 
x noted 3 000 to 10 000 sheep lost and 300 000 poultry dead 
x damage to crops estimated at more than $10 million 
Note: Inundation is defined as water over floorboard level. Affected is defined as inundated or 
isolated. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
The RIAs provided key data to inform the government’s planning and prioritisation for 
financial assistance and support to councils and communities. There were inherent 
problems in risk assessment following the floods as:   
x damage was not easily seen or known at the time because much land was still 
under water 
x water damage could continue to degrade buildings and land once it had moved 
on, particularly mould which became an issue later. 
However, there were also problems with the way risk assessment was undertaken and 
communicated. The councils visited for the audit were not informed or aware of: 
x the purpose of the RIA 
x what data was collected and why—i.e. the criteria 
x how the data would be used  
x the standard process for coordinating, gathering, recording and reporting on 
impact related information.  
This led to concerns by councils that flood-related damage in their municipality would 
be underestimated, and adversely affect funding eligibility and financial assistance. 
Further, insurance claims assessments were considered inadequate and unable to 
support prompt lodgement of insurance claims by councils, individuals and the 
community. Councils were also concerned about the reliability, accuracy, thoroughness 
and completeness of the RIAs. 
Overall, impact data was patchy and inconsistent and without systematic verification 
processes. Regional staff relied in part on an incomplete data base of farm listings to 
establish damage to farms, and not all farmers could be contacted. 
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The Comrie Review found similar issues to those identified during this audit's field work 
and recommended improvement to the RIA process. However, although the 
government’s response to the Comrie Review was silent on 62 of the 93 
recommendations—including those relating to RIA—the government’s December 2012 
White Paper on Emergency Management Reform includes an action to review the 
impact assessment system. 
Rapid assessment of damage is often imprecise, given the time pressures and 
incomplete knowledge of impacts, especially in a flood situation where much of the 
damage is hidden underwater or under road structures.  
However, data collection can be improved so that Victoria is better equipped to assess 
impacts of future emergency events.  
2.4.3 Planning for implementation 
Pre-existing state and regional flood plans  
A State Flood Response Plan, as distinct from a plan which would encompass all 
phases of emergency management, was in place at the time of the 2011 floods but 
was of limited use in planning for relief and recovery. The plan had not been updated 
since 2007. Regional plans had also not recently been reviewed. 
The Comrie Review commented on the fact that regional plans merely copied the 
information contained in the state plan, without attempts to customise it to local 
conditions. It also found that municipal plans for emergencies were incomplete or draft 
at the time of the floods.   
Pre-existing plans therefore provided little assistance for relief and recovery following 
the 2011 floods. 
Flood recovery work plan priorities 
The Work Plan was completed as a threshold requirement rather than as a part of any 
real planning for implementation. It prioritises programs, such as the clean-up fund, 
personal hardship grants and community recovery fund. However because the Work 
Plan was completed six months after the floods, many of these programs were already 
being implemented. 
The real planning for implementation was based on RIAs, but also informed by: 
x emergency relief requirements under the Emergency Management Act 1986 and 
EMMV, such as for personal hardship grants  
x initiatives that were deemed to be successful and rolled out previously at the time 
of bushfires and drought, such as the Apprenticeship Retention Program. 
DTF, on request from the SFRG, prepared a funding proposal for government in 
March 2011. This sought output funding of $117 million for response and recovery, 
support for public asset restoration and business recovery, and a further $136 million in 
asset funding.   
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The proposal was based on bids prepared by each department, which were reviewed 
and assessed by DTF in order to develop a final set of initiatives for funding. Total 
funding approved was less than the aggregate funding sought.  
This approach—of each department preparing its own bid and the need for DTF's 
assessment of these in order to develop a final proposal—is linked to the governance 
model which saw each of the nine departments controlling their own funding programs.   
DTF's funding proposal represents a coherent set of initiatives with appropriate relief 
programs as well as medium- and longer-term recovery initiatives. This formed a 
sound basis for the subsequent roll-out of programs and more detailed planning which 
occurred at the regional and local level. 
All councils visited for the audit developed action plans to drive short- and 
medium-term relief and recovery and were developing longer-term actions to better 
prepare for future disasters.  
However, there were few departmental plans to support relief and recovery activity.  
Despite the government’s requirement that sustained, long-term plans be developed 
for the six geographic areas most severely affected, they have yet not been developed. 
Recommendation 
1. The Department of Justice should review the current model for rapid impact 
assessment to improve the quality of the information collected.  
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3 Overarching implementation issues  
At a glance 
Background  
The model for flood relief and recovery involved all departments, nine of which 
administered a number of programs funded by the Commonwealth and the state under 
the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA). Local government 
played an important role in overall relief and recovery efforts. 
Conclusion 
The multiple departments and programs involved made for a fragmented relief and 
recovery approach which was difficult for communities and councils to understand and 
navigate. The model did not assist government to explain the complex rules attached to 
NDRRA funding and there may have been lost opportunities for local government to 
claim funds for necessary improvements. The Commonwealth has yet to agree to a 
Department of Treasury and Finance request for a 12–month extension to the NDRRA 
funding time frame to allow some councils time to expend funding for recovery work. 
Limitations with local government capacity and with communication have slowed 
implementation progress. 
Findings  
x The lack of timely guidance by Department of Treasury and Finance made it 
difficult for councils to understand the NDRRA conditions for betterment funding. 
x There were significant differences in capacity across the councils affected by the 
2011 floods, yet all were required to play a major role in relief and recovery 
according to the degree of damage. 
x The lack of a centralised, single information source adversely affected 
communities' understanding of available financial assistance and support. 
Recommendations 
x Local Government Victoria should lead the design and implementation of 
strategies to support councils to further develop social capital needed for recovery  
x The Department of Human Services should develop an improved model for 
communication for future disasters that provides a single point of information and 
contact for disaster affected communities. 
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3.1 Introduction 
This audit identified a range of overarching issues in relation to implementation of flood 
relief and recovery. These issues relate to: 
x the fragmented nature of relief and recovery programs 
x the timely release of funding 
x constraints attached to how Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements 
(NDRRA) funding could be used, particularly in relation to replacing damaged 
assets with more disaster resilient infrastructure—known as betterment 
x the capacity of some local government authorities to deliver their part of the relief 
and recovery effort 
x communication to local councils and to affected communities. 
3.2 Conclusion 
The large number of departments and programs involved caused a fragmented 
approach to relief and recovery which was hard for communities and local councils to 
understand.  
Government did not clearly explain the complex rules attached to NDRRA funding, 
especially around the betterment issue and there may have been lost opportunities for 
councils to claim funds for necessary improvements.  
Problems with local government capacity and with communication also adversely 
affected implementation, including time taken to claim and expend funds. 
The Commonwealth has not yet agreed to a Department of Treasury and Finance 
(DTF) request for a 12-month extension to the NDRRA funding timeframe which would 
allow some local councils extra time to expend funding.  
3.3 The fragmented delivery model 
Funding to local councils and communities was administered by nine departments and 
agencies, all with different delivery arrangements and requirements. The Department 
of Premier and Cabinet was the only agency which did not directly administer funds. 
The departments that administered a range of relief and recovery programs are shown 
in Figure 3A.  
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  Figure 3A
Departments responsible for the delivery of relief and recovery programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The Department of Human Services (DHS) and the Department of Health (DH) have been counted as one 
department as they took joint responsibility for delivering emergency relief and recovery programs. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from departmental documentation.  
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There were 45 relief and recovery programs, many requiring an application, as shown 
in Figure 3A. Each department was responsible for administering its programs and 
informing councils and communities of application requirements.  
Programs had different administrative processes, funding periods, criteria, financial 
thresholds and approval mechanisms, and reporting and acquittal processes. 
Guidance about the rules of some programs was inadequate and required further 
explanation.  
Fieldwork conducted for this audit in three local government areas identified that: 
x Local councils and communities found the number of programs confusing and the 
differentiation between them often unclear. 
x Different departments were responsible for similar types of funding. 
For example, worker funding for Flood Recovery Officers (FRO) from the 
Department of Planning and Community Development (DPCD), and funding for 
Rural Coordination Officers from the Department of Primary Industries (DPI). This 
saw some councils combine the funding to extend the contract period for FROs. 
x The different processes and stringency in rules attached to different schemes 
was confusing and often disproportionate to the funding amount.  
Overall, the many program compartments in which funding was organised reduced 
flexibility, meant that opportunities for synergy were lost, and caused unnecessary 
administrative burden across government departments.   
Program fragmentation created a complex environment that councils and communities 
were required to understand and navigate in difficult and traumatic times. 
The Review of the 2010–11 Flood Warning and Response Final Report (the Comrie 
Review) advocated funding being issued early, as packages that could be used flexibly 
for a variety of purposes around relief and early recovery, rather than in a traditional 
program format. This would allow councils and agencies to quickly respond, and still 
provide government time to consider what additional initiatives may be required.  
The Comrie Review recommended that the state finalise a review of municipal 
assistance, including addressing the issue of packages around relief and early 
recovery. This is one of the 62 recommendations in the report to which the government 
has not yet formally responded.  
DTF advised that it is currently reviewing the natural disaster financial assistance 
provided to councils. DTF should consider the findings of this audit and the Comrie 
Review in relation to funding flexibility as part of its review. 
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3.4 Funding issues 
3.4.1 Release of funding 
The fragmented delivery model described in Section 3.3 impacted the release of 
funding for the flood relief and recovery programs.  
Some funding, such as Personal Hardship Grants for individuals, was released straight 
away and Local Government Clean Up Funding payments of $100 000 were made 
within 2–3 weeks to the 16 councils most severely affected.   
However, despite the early release of specific funding, most took some time to be 
released. Each department had to prepare budget bids for proposed funding for 
consideration by government. This meant that funding decisions were not made as 
quickly as would have been possible under a single submission approach. It forced 
departments to compete with each other for limited funds and required intensive work 
by DTF to assess the merits of each submission at a time when efforts could have 
been applied to other areas of relief and recovery preparation.  
Funding for flood recovery initiatives was approved by government at the end of 
March 2011, some two months after the main flood events. The time taken to release 
funding adversely affected when local councils and other local service providers could 
commence recruitment of staff to provide key services, including: 
x FROs to take over operational management of local recovery and to relieve 
council staff who had been diverted from their substantive roles 
x case workers and counsellors to provide psychosocial services and support. 
3.4.2 Commonwealth funding expenditure 
The Commonwealth has advanced the state $500 million. At the time of finalising this 
report, the Commonwealth is only liable for approximately $350 million of the total 
estimated cost of the relief and recovery effort. However, DTF has been given approval 
by the Commonwealth to use the rest of the $500 million for the subsequent disaster 
events in 2011 and 2012. 
The NDRRA determination requires the state to provide the Commonwealth with 
audited financial statements which acquit the money spent on natural disasters. This is 
required as soon as practicable after the end of the financial year in which an advance 
was made, and an extension must be sought if the statements cannot be provided 
within six months. Financial statements acquitting the 2010–11 NDRRA flood funding 
had not been prepared by DTF at the date of preparation of this report. 
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3.5 Constraints posed by NDRRA rules 
3.5.1 Betterment 
The betterment principle was introduced in the 2007 NDRRA Determination and 
enables states and local councils to apply to the Commonwealth for NDRRA funding to 
improve the disaster resilience of essential public assets damaged in natural disasters.  
DTF advised that the betterment principle has been complex to interpret and apply, 
and, as at May 2013, only one betterment project in Australia has been approved by 
the Commonwealth.  
Category B of the NDRRA funding provides for work on public assets that restores or 
replaces the asset to pre-disaster standard and to a more disaster resilient standard, in 
accordance with current building and engineering standards. It does not provide for 
asset expansion or enhancement beyond this. For example, adding lanes to roads 
damaged in a disaster is not eligible for assistance. Essential public assets are 
primarily state or local government owned. 
The NDRRA can be used for betterment if the state: 
x can satisfy the Commonwealth that the betterment proposal is cost effective and 
that the increased disaster-resilience of the asset will mitigate the impact of future 
natural disasters 
x obtains approval from the Commonwealth before commencing betterment works. 
Betterment funding is typically on a 50:50 basis for state assets, and a one-third, 
one-third and one-third basis for local government assets. 
There was an opportunity for the state and councils to obtain additional financial 
assistance from the Commonwealth to improve the disaster resilience of important 
public assets that were being restored or replaced as part of the response to the 
floods.  
However, taking advantage of this opportunity required DTF to play a role in identifying 
and processing betterment proposals. Evidence shows that DTF's advice and support 
to councils on betterment was not sufficiently timely. However, this was partly due to 
the need for ongoing discussions with the Commonwealth to clarify the interpretation of 
the betterment funding principle. As a consequence of advice not being timely, the 
state and councils may have missed out on Commonwealth funding.  
Councils visited as part of the audit said they considered that there was a lack of 
advice and guidance available to them on the practical application of the betterment 
principle in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 floods.  
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This was particularly in relation to: 
x the definition of an essential public asset 
x whether the provisions related to all or part of an asset 
x whether different approval processes applied according to the amount of funding 
required  
x differentiating asset improvements to mitigate the impact of future natural 
disasters versus improvements required to meet changes in engineering 
standards or practices 
x differentiating between eligible betterment and an ineligible increase in 
functionality or capacity. 
The December 2011 Comrie Review also highlighted the betterment funding issue as 
an area of confusion for councils. 
DTF advised that betterment was a relatively new and complex form of assistance and 
that it had worked with the Commonwealth during 2011 to develop some advice to 
councils on the replacement of essential public infrastructure, including betterment and 
enhancement. Notwithstanding this, the delays in clarifying the betterment principle 
meant that DTF was not able to provide authoritative advice to councils and agencies 
in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 floods. 
In addition, the advice on DTF's website in early 2011 in relation to betterment was 
inconsistent with the definition of betterment found in the NDRRA Determination 2007 
causing further confusion for agencies and councils. DTF did not update its website on 
this issue until June 2011.  
The betterment issue featured consistently during the meetings of the Secretaries’ 
Flood Recovery Group (SFRG) during 2011. In March 2011 the SFRG directed that a 
letter be sent to councils to encourage them to proceed with necessary recovery and 
reconstruction work, and clarifying funding arrangements for asset betterment. This 
letter was not sent until late July/early August 2011—some four months after the need 
was identified.  
This lack of guidance made it difficult for councils to understand the conditions of 
betterment, particularly in relation to restoring roads to be more disaster resilient.  
In some cases answers from DTF to several questions from councils were not 
provided after a period of several months. This lack of clarity, and the time taken to 
provide information, served as a deterrent to councils who could not delay restoration 
and rebuilding work indefinitely.  
A common issue raised by councils was the installation of culverts and levees in 
damaged roads, to improve drainage and withstand future flooding. In the case of 
Loddon Shire, the council self-funded minor betterment works to avoid delay to 
rebuilding and restoration, however, this may not have been viable for other councils, 
whose financial capacity was more limited.   
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In March 2012, DTF issued advice which confirmed costs associated with providing an 
additional culvert when repairing a road damaged from a natural disaster would be 
eligible for NDRRA reimbursement, as long as there was an increase in disaster 
resilience and a net benefit could be demonstrated.  
In December 2012, the Commonwealth released new guidance material on betterment 
as part of the revised 2012 NDRRA Determination to improve the clarity of what 
betterment means and the process for seeking funding for betterment projects. 
Applications for betterment funding 
In April 2011 the SFRG directed that a list of all significant betterment projects be 
developed for the Commonwealth. This list was not finalised and provided to the 
Commonwealth until September 2011.  
The state's proposals included 23 projects with a total cost of $47.3 million. The 
betterment component of this total cost was $13.3 million. The bulk of the projects 
were from VicRoads although the largest single proposal related to the Charlton 
Hospital. Figure 3B shows examples of the betterment proposals. 
  Figure 3B
Victorian betterment proposals at September 2011 
Project Betterment description 
Total cost 
($ million) 
Betterment 
portion 
($ million) 
Charlton Hospital rebuilding 
(Department of Health) 
Purchase of new site for 
hospital to mitigate future 
flooding risk 
20.0 5.0 
Railway track improvements on 
Ballarat - Ararat line (V/Line) 
Construct culverts to 
make more flood resilient 
2.9 2.9 
Reconstruction of Wimmera 
Highway Bridge over 
Yarriambiack Creek (VicRoads) 
Improvement to hydraulic 
capacity of the bridge 
1.8 0.9 
Kerang—Murrabit Road 
(VicRoads) 
Increase height of road to 
raise it above flood level 
0.9 0.6 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from departmental documentation. 
There were no council projects included in the list submitted to the Commonwealth in 
September 2011. This may be due to the delays in providing clear advice to councils 
on betterment funding. DTF subsequently forwarded betterment proposals to the 
Commonwealth on behalf of a few flood-affected councils. 
At the time of preparation of this report no betterment proposals had been approved by 
the Commonwealth for Victoria. NDRRA funds to relocate the Charlton Hospital have 
been approved but this was not under betterment provisions. 
DTF advised that it is working with the Commonwealth to develop a more streamlined 
approach for betterment proposals. 
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3.5.2 Use of council staff 
Councils could not claim recovery works performed by council staff and with council 
plant and equipment through the NDRRA.  
In areas where the capacity for attracting people with the required skills was limited, 
this slowed the recovery process. This was particularly the case with engineering and 
skilled construction workers required for road and bridge repair.   
3.5.3 Time limits on expenditure 
Under the NDRRA, all expenditure must occur within two years after the end of the 
financial year in which the emergency event occurred. At the time of finalising this 
report 15 councils were anticipating they would not be able to expend funds within the 
required timeframe. 
There has been no response from the Commonwealth to the submission by DTF in 
November 2012 requesting a 12-month extension.  
3.6 Role and capacity of local government 
3.6.1 Role of local government 
Local government is an important player in informing and delivering services to its 
communities. It is asked to perform a significant role in emergency management, but 
the boundary between its role, and that of state departments, is not always clear. 
Communities were also confused about local councils’ relief and recovery role versus 
that of government departments.   
The floods experience showed that, although local councils largely rose to the 
challenge of providing relief and recovery, issues around roles persist. 
The issue of role clarity is not new. The Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV) raised 
it in December 2011 in a position paper on the role of local government in emergency 
management, and in a submission in response to the Green Paper on emergency 
management reforms in November 2011. 
However, the issue has not yet been properly addressed. MAV's involvement as a 
member of the new State Crisis and Resilience Council may serve to continue to raise 
role clarity issues. 
3.6.2 Recovery capacity and capability 
The variation in capacity across local councils, particularly in regional Victoria, is a 
further ongoing issue. Capacity is linked to rate revenue base and councils' ability to 
attract necessary skills and expertise.  
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There were significant differences in capacity across the councils affected by the 2011 
floods, yet all were required to play a major role in relief and recovery according to the 
degree of damage sustained, and irrespective of resource and skill limitations. Some of 
the most vulnerable councils had large road networks that suffered significant damage 
in the floods and therefore they faced a challenging management and logistics task in 
undertaking repair works.  
As early as 17 January 2011, the Central Government Response Committee was 
being briefed about local governments that lacked capability and would need additional 
support to play their role in relief and recovery. Uncertainty about council capacity and 
capability to effectively implement recovery activities was identified as a key risk in 
Victoria's Flood Recovery Work Plan and was regularly discussed by the SFRG. 
Specific concerns about the capacity of some councils to undertake the scale of 
recovery and remediation work required included their ability to hire additional 
resources funded by the state government, pursuing grants within time lines, and 
project management of reconstruction works.  
The SFRG's role in relation to this issue is discussed in Part 2.  
The capacity of councils to undertake recovery tasks continues to be an issue. This 
affects the roll-out of recovery projects and, in turn, affects the recovery of the affected 
communities.   
3.6.3 Local government response  
For the most part, local councils were quick to respond and generally, networks 
between councils played a strong role in assisting responsiveness. Smaller councils 
were ‘buddied’ by larger councils who were able to divert resources in the short term to 
assist.  
For example, the Shire of Campaspe was aided by Moira Shire, and Loddon Shire by 
the City of Greater Bendigo. Northern Grampians Shire received assistance from the 
Shire of Yarra Ranges which, while not geographically close, had prior relevant 
experience in emergency recovery. 
This is consistent with the MAV’s policy to encourage partnerships between councils to 
pool resources and offer help to members when required. The experience on the 
ground also showed that social capital—a strong, stable and experienced workforce, 
good leadership and well developed networks and relationships—is a powerful 
determinant of effective response. It can trigger staff exchange/deployment, practical 
advice and other forms of assistance beyond that which can be achieved through 
procedures, manuals and planning alone.  
Good planning and procedures are important, and familiarity with those procedures 
and staff training will continue to be critical to how well emergency response, relief and 
recovery occurs at the local level. However, relationships and shared knowledge will 
be a significant influence in determining success. 
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3.6.4 The state's role in building local government capacity 
If the state is to continue to depend on local government to play a major role in 
emergency management, it needs to help develop councils’ capacity. This could 
require targeted assistance to build skills and undertake planning tasks. 
It also needs to support collaborative approaches across local government, and the 
building of social capital, which has proven to be so effective in relief and recovery 
efforts after the floods.  
3.7 The communication model 
In a disaster situation, it is critical that current and relevant information is coordinated, 
consistent, and rapidly disseminated to communities and key organisations such as 
councils to assist their immediate relief and then recovery.  
Well developed and tested communication channels, using a range of media, are vital 
for reaching as many people as quickly as possible. 
3.7.1 Central government communications  
The many players involved in delivering relief and recovery, together with the number 
of communities affected by the floods made the communication task extremely 
challenging, and required a highly organised approach to ensure communication was 
clear, current and consistent. 
Immediately after the floods, Crisis Communication Teams were established at the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet and the Department of Human Services (DHS) to 
coordinate public information, web communications and media, and to coordinate 
stakeholder and internal communications.  
By early March 2011, departmental and agency communications directors had formed 
a Flood Recovery Communications Working Group, which was supported by the 
Health and Human Services Management communications team.  
When the SFRG was formed, all whole-of-government communications became the 
responsibility of a rebadged committee, the Flood Recovery Communications Group 
(FRCG). The FRCG was responsible for coordinating communication across 
government departments and agencies, ensuring key issues were addressed and that 
consistent and targeted information was provided. This work was guided by a 
whole-of-government communications framework and communications strategy.   
At a central level, the approach to communication was structured and organised. It 
targeted people living and working in flood-affected areas as well as businesses, local 
government and local organisations affected by the flooding.  
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Coverage, in terms of included agencies, issues, information and the range of tools 
and media employed was comprehensive. Key tasks were broken down across the 
quadrant of recovery themes—i.e. people, social, health and community, economic 
(agriculture and business), built environment (community assets and transport) and 
natural environment.  
The information provided was comprehensive, but this did not guarantee that the 
messages being communicated met the needs of communities and councils. The 
many departmental players involved may have contributed to the mixed and conflicting 
messages for local government and community. The lack of a central point of contact 
with information for flood-affected communities was a major weakness in 
communication.   
In the immediate aftermath of the floods, financial support information was posted on 
the DHS website with links to other department websites. A new whole-of-government 
flood recovery website was launched on 8 July 2011.   
This was an improvement as it centralised communication and information, rather than 
being department led. However, it did not eliminate the need for authoritative, 
consistent and accessible communication for communities and local government. 
Communication about available support and assistance was particularly urgent and in 
demand. Outreach services provided by DHS and the Red Cross aimed to reach 
people who were more isolated. 
A range of communication options is vital for communities who are in distress and 
experiencing significant hardship. A website needs to be complemented by other forms 
of communication giving the same messages. In part, this was achieved through an 
extensive media strategy—advertising, printed material, radio and television—as well 
as fact sheets and mail drops to communities. 
One of the stakeholders consulted for this audit recommended the use of a hotline, to 
serve as an interactive mechanism that could provide accurate information, and 
answer queries.  
An independent review of the 2010–11 flood recovery communications identified 
improvements needed for future communication methods. This included streamlining 
information, and increasing two-way communication for those with questions that go 
beyond the general information available.  
DHS has moved to implement recommended improvements. In December 2012, the 
Victorian Emergency Relief and Recovery 24/7 Information Line was launched for all 
emergency relief and recovery inquiries. The information line operated over the 
2012–13 fire season. 
Further improvements identified in the evaluation are discussed in more detail in 
Part 5.  
Overarching implementation issues  
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3.7.2 Regional communication arrangements 
Generally, regional communication across departments and with local government was 
good, particularly where regional department representatives had pre-existing 
relationships with each other and with councils in their region. 
However, information provided by regional department staff in relief and recovery 
centres lacked consistency which was confusing for individuals, communities and 
businesses. 
A number of councils and departments have noted the proactive approach taken by 
DTF in contacting councils to provide information and help them apply for financial 
assistance. This is commendable, especially given that, as a central agency without a 
regional presence, DTF did not have existing networks and relationships. This 
proactive approach should be maintained in future disasters.   
3.7.3 Local communication arrangements 
Councils, together with the mayor, played a key role in communicating recovery 
progress and information to communities, including: 
x community consultation meetings, which started within a few days of the major 
flood events 
x initial daily radio updates by the mayor on key issues, action being taken and 
contact information for assistance and support—this reduced to once a week 
when grant applications had peaked  
x issue of flood newsletters—via an official website—containing advice, key 
contacts, web site information and phone numbers  
x quarterly council bulletins—by mail—listing all road repairs, recovery progress 
and scheduled dates for repair works.  
Overall, most local councils communicated well with their communities in difficult 
circumstances. 
Recommendations 
2. Local Government Victoria should lead the design and implementation of 
strategies to support councils to further develop social capital needed for 
recovery. 
3. The Department of Human Services should develop an improved model for 
communication for future disasters that provides a single point of information and 
contact for disaster affected communities.  
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4 Delivering community relief and recovery initiatives 
At a glance 
Background  
After the floods, a range of relief and recovery programs were rolled out to assist 
communities, businesses and primary producers. This audit examined 15 relief and 
recovery initiatives delivered by Victorian government departments. 
Conclusion 
The 15 community relief and recovery programs delivered much needed relief and 
recovery support to the disaster-affected communities. Overall, the programs formed a 
suite which adequately addressed community and business needs. However, the many 
departments involved in the planning, information provision, and administration of the 
initiatives, led to confusion and frustration in some affected communities. 
Findings  
x Each of the 15 initiatives examined was designed to target different aspects of 
community relief and recovery. Collectively they addressed relief and recovery 
needs but differing application processes, eligibility rules and governance created 
confusion at the community level. 
x There was no single, central point of contact for councils, communities and 
businesses to get information from the government about assistance available.  
x Short-term community relief and recovery programs were well implemented and 
generally well received by affected communities. Longer-term recovery programs 
proved more challenging.  
Recommendations 
x The Department of Premier and Cabinet should develop clear guidelines for 
departments in designing community disaster relief and recovery programs. 
x Rural Finance Corporation (Department of Treasury and Finance) and Regional 
Development Victoria should coordinate any future disaster relief and recovery 
programs for businesses. 
x Regional Development Victoria should implement the recommendations from 
DPCD's review of the Community Recovery Fund to improve the delivery of relief 
and recovery programs in future. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The coordinated delivery of relief and recovery activities is important so that affected 
communities can be provided with support in a timely and efficient manner. 
This audit focused on 15 state government programs providing community relief and 
recovery to individuals, businesses—including farmers—and local councils in affected 
areas. 
It is important to acknowledge that, although relief programs and many recovery 
programs have concluded, the process of recovery at the community level is 
continuing in the most severely affected communities. 
4.2 Conclusion 
The community relief and recovery initiatives delivered by the state following the flood 
disaster events of 2010–11 adequately covered the major areas of social and 
economic recovery, and the built and natural environment. 
The programs worked to deliver much needed relief and recovery support to 
disaster-affected communities. However, there were inconsistencies due to the number 
of departments involved in the planning, design, and administration of the initiatives. 
This led to confusion and frustration in some communities that were under 
considerable stress. 
4.3 Overview of relief and recovery initiatives 
This audit examined 15 community relief and recovery initiatives delivered by five state 
departments to assist and support the flood-affected communities primarily at three 
levels. These were: 
x individuals and families 
x businesses 
x local councils. 
In many instances, where individual programs were directed to a specific sector of the 
affected communities—for example businesses— they had different processes around 
planning, access, governance and evaluation. These differences made the overall 
approach fragmented. 
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This part presents a comparative analysis of the relief and recovery programs on offer 
for the three sectors of the community. Figure 4A provides an evaluative summary of 
performance of the 15 programs across four domains:  
x planning—adequate planning and prioritisation 
x access—ease of community access including: 
x clear and timely information of the program to the target audience 
x application/eligibility criteria and documentation requirements 
x approval or rejection decisions conveyed appropriately 
x scope for flexibility in funding use 
x governance—including departmental structures in place to assess, approve and 
monitor funding applications 
x evaluations—program evaluations completed. 
  Figure 4A
Overview of relief and recovery initiatives 
Initiative Cost $ (mil) Planning Access Governance Evaluation 
Department of Human Services (DHS) 
Interim Accommodation Plan 2.2 9 9 9 None 
Personal Hardship Grants 20.1 9 9 9 None 
Psychosocial Recovery 4.7 NS  9 9 9 
Department of Planning and Community Development (DPCD) 
Business Flood Recovery Fund 10.0 9 NS  9 None 
Community Recovery Fund 4.0 9 NS NS 9 
Local Government Clean-Up Fund 5.0 9 9 9 None 
Flood Recovery Officers 2.1 NS 9 9 9 
Flood Recovery Community 
Infrastructure Fund(a) 
8.0 9 9 9 None 
Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) 
Flood Recovery Community 
Infrastructure Fund(b) 
22.0 9 NS 9 None 
Department of Primary Industries (DPI) 
Apprenticeship Retention Program 1.0 9 9 9 None 
Rural Coordination Officers 0.5 NS 9 9 9 
Rural Financial Counsellors 3.4 9 9 9 9 
Flood Response and Recovery 3.6 9 NA 9 9 
Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) - Rural Finance Corporation (RFC) 
Clean-Up and Restoration Grants 82.0 9 9 9 None 
Exceptional Disaster Assistance 1.4 9 NS 9 None 
Concessional Loans 6.0 9 NS 9 None 
Total 176.0     
(a) Delivered by DPCD for projects on non-Crown land. 
(b) Delivered by DSE for projects on Crown land. 
Note: 9– Program performance is adequate, NS – not satisfactory, NA – not applicable, None – no information 
available. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from departmental documentation. 
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4.4 Delivery of relief and recovery initiatives  
The Victorian Council of Social Services, in its submission to the Review of the  
2010–11 Flood Warning and Response (the Comrie Review) stated that: 
'Flood is a slow burn crisis with lasting social and economic impacts. Sustained, long 
term and flexible economic and psychosocial supports which address both individual 
and community support needs will be critical to prevent escalating impacts and to 
support community recovery.' 
Each of the 15 examined initiatives targeted different aspects of community relief and 
recovery. However, differing eligibility rules, application rules and governance 
frameworks created confusion at the local community level. 
 Individual-level relief and recovery initiatives 4.4.1
Relief and recovery support for individuals was provided by Centrelink at the 
Commonwealth level, the Department of Human Services (DHS) at a state level and 
by non-government organisations such as the Salvation Army and Red Cross. 
Figure 4B provides a summary of the individual-level programs examined in this audit. 
  Figure 4B
Individual relief and recovery programs 
Program Department Summary 
Interim 
Accommodation 
Plan  
DHS Temporary accommodation assistance for individuals or 
families whose homes had been damaged. Caravans, 
moveable units and temporary rent assistance were 
available to people while homes were repaired. 
x $2.2 million for 110 temporary tenancies and 
709 interim accommodation referrals.  
Psychosocial 
Recovery 
DHS Funding for additional staff to deliver counselling, case 
work support and community forums. 
x $4.7 million for 1 631 clients over 3 266 sessions 
and 10 521 contacts in outreach sessions. 
Personal 
Hardship Grant 
DHS Assistance with the cost of essentials such as shelter, 
food, clothing, personal items or specific transport 
needs.  
x Immediate upfront payments to individuals—adult 
$427, child $213, up to $1067 per household—to 
reduce personal hardship.  
x Financial assistance entitlements were paid to 
recipients by prepaid debit card. 
x $20 million for 8 857 needs-assessed emergency 
grants and 2 484 major grants 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from departmental documentation. 
For the most part, short-term community relief and recovery programs were well 
implemented and generally well received by affected communities. 
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DHS quickly implemented its personal hardship grants and interim accommodation 
program through community recovery centres. This response to the most pressing 
needs was based on its prior experience with natural disasters. Appropriate fraud 
controls were put in place for this kind of aid and it is likely that the number of those 
getting help who were not eligible was small. An issue raised by local communities was 
that DHS' needs-assessed emergency grants application process was more 
cumbersome and time consuming than that of the Commonwealth government's 
Centrelink service.  
A number of councils, in their flood recovery evaluation, identified that there was a 
significant number of individuals eligible for interim accommodation and personal 
hardship grants that did not apply, either because they did not know about them or 
thought that there were other people in greater need. 
In some cases, recovery commencement was affected by lengthy delays in getting 
programs underway, funds flowing or services delivered to people who were eligible. 
Figure 4C provides an example of program funding delay. 
  Figure 4C
Example of funding delay for psychosocial recovery services 
Inglewood District Health Service, Loddon Shire 
Inglewood District Health Service (IDHS) is situated in the Shire of Loddon—one of the 
communities that was severely affected in the 2010–11 floods. It serves the southern half of 
Loddon Shire which has a population of approximately 5 500.  
After the January 2011 floods: 
x DHS advised IDHS that funding would be available for counsellors and case support 
workers, but not the amount. 
x IDHS could not recruit people until the amount was finalised. 
x The lack of clarity resulted in a six to eight week delay in starting the recruitment 
process with flow on effects as to when counselling services became available to the 
community. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office.  
In Rochester, located within the Shire of Campaspe, the community's health service—
Rochester and Elmore District Health Services (REDHS)—was only provided with 
funding for psychosocial case workers in May 2011 some four months after the floods 
in Campaspe. However, the support and counselling services provided by REDHS 
were exceptionally well regarded by the Campaspe community once operational.  
These delays in funding meant services were not on the ground early when this 
support was needed.  
Nevertheless, overall the audit found that these programs were effectively and 
efficiently designed. 
 Business-level relief and recovery initiatives 4.4.2
At the business level, flood relief and recovery programs were designed to target 
businesses, agriculture, dairy, livestock and other primary industries. Figure 4D 
provides a summary of these programs. 
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  Figure 4D
Business relief and recovery programs 
Initiative Department Summary 
Victorian 
Business Flood 
Recovery Fund 
DPCD $10 million to stimulate job creation and promote economic 
development by encouraging private sector investment.  
• Medium to large businesses eligible to apply for grants ranging 
from $50 000 to $2 million during 2011–12 and 2012–13.  
• 34 projects funded ranging from $50 000 to  
$750 000. 
• Managed jointly by DPCD through Regional Development Victoria 
and the Department of Business and Innovation. 
Apprenticeship 
Retention 
Program 
DPI $1 million to support retention of apprentices in 28 flood-affected 
LGAs based on a similar program from the 2009 bushfire recovery. 
• Businesses received a one off payment of $750 for each 
apprentice employed for an initial six-month period and a further 
$750 if the same apprentice was still employed later in 2011. 
• 626 apprenticeship retention places funded totalling $860 411. 
Rural Financial 
Counsellors 
(RFC) 
DPI $3.4 million to augment the existing Rural Financial Counselling 
Service (RFCS). 
Flood Response 
and Recovery 
DPI $3.6 million to provide response and support services to the 
agricultural sector and farm businesses to rebuild and recover.  
• Activities undertaken include establishing a statewide Flood 
Recovery Centre with an Incident Management Team at Bendigo. 
RFC – Clean-
Up and 
Restoration 
Grants 
DTF/RFC Grants of up to $25 000 available to primary producers, small 
businesses and not-for-profit organisations for clean-up, removal of 
debris and business restoration on private land. Discretionary 
payment not income tested, but based on need demonstrated 
through an assessment process. 
• 5 330 grants funded totalling $82 million. 
RFC – 
Concessional 
Loans 
DTF/RFC Loans of up to $200 000 available to eligible primary producers, small 
businesses and not-for-profit organisations whose properties have 
suffered direct damage as a result of the floods. Loans could be used 
for the replacement of lost or damaged assets and for essential 
working capital finance if applicable. Adequate security was required 
for any lending and applications were evaluated after taking into 
consideration insurance recoveries and other financial recoveries 
available. 
• 220 loans totalling $22 million. 
RFC – 
Exceptional 
Disaster 
Assistance – 
Grants and 
Loans 
DTF/RFC Initiative designed to provide loans and grants to primary producers 
and small-to-medium businesses essential to key economic supply 
chains and regional employment provided for re-establishment costs 
arising from direct extreme flood damage. 
• 11 grants totalling $197 333 and 13 loans totalling $6 million. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from departmental documents. 
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Access to business-level relief and recovery programs 
Limited coordination by departments for business-level relief and recovery programs 
contributed to: 
x a lack of consistent information  
x varying access rules for programs 
x arduous application procedures. 
An example of these issues is shown in Figure 4E.  
  Figure 4E
Example of the experience of businesses after the 2010–11 floods 
Mount Alexander Shire Council's evaluation of flood recovery in the community found that, 
in general, business owners found accessing recovery information confusing and time 
consuming. It states that: 
'…many business owners did not have the time to sit down and go through information as 
they were focused on trying to maintain business operations as soon as possible after the 
floods.' 
The evaluation recommended that: 
x the state needs to review the current business support model for future disaster events 
x an agency should be charged with taking the lead role for business support and ensure 
that clear and concise information is provided from the outset.  
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on Mount Alexander Shire Council's evaluation 
of the 2011 flood recovery efforts. 
Businesses in flood-affected areas had to analyse and understand varying and 
complex funding, eligibility and application criteria of the Victorian Business Flood 
Recovery Fund (VBRF), the DTF RFC-Exceptional Disaster Assistance Grants and 
Loans, and the RFC Concessional Loans, in order to access these grants within set 
time periods. 
For businesses—many under pressure from a decade or more of drought—applying 
for any of these grants and loans was a very complex, difficult and time-consuming 
task. This may have affected take-up.  
DPI managed the mainly Commonwealth funded Rural Finance Counselling Service 
(RFCS), which was invaluable for many businesses applying for the available grants 
and loans. However, financial counsellors could not advocate for, or coordinate the 
application processes, for the businesses they were assisting. 
There was also no coordination between the various service providers to explain 
differences in flood relief and recovery programs for businesses. 
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In future disaster situations, having clear explanation of the rationale and rules for 
different grants and loan options and more coordinated criteria across all departments 
would help the businesses most in need get the appropriate type and level of funding. 
 Local council-level flood relief and recovery initiatives 4.4.3
Approximately 70—or almost 90 per cent—of Victoria's 79 councils were affected by 
the 2010–11 flood events. Many of these councils suffered further damage in 
subsequent floods in late-2011 and 2012.  
DPCD's Regional Development Victoria (RDV) identified 32 severely affected councils 
after the major floods in mid-January 2011. Of these, 16 were very severely affected. 
Local councils were supported by relief and recovery initiatives including clean-up 
grants, community support, and community infrastructure restoration. Figure 4F 
provides a summary of the community relief and recovery activities for local councils. 
  Figure 4F
Local council relief and recovery activities 
Initiative Department Summary 
Local Government 
Clean-up Fund 
DPCD $5 million initiative established to give 32 
flood-affected LGAs funds for clean-up and repair 
activities such as removal of damaged household 
goods, restoration of streetscapes.  
Flood Recovery 
Officers (FRO) 
DPCD 
 
$2.1 million initiative for 19 FROs to assist 32 
councils with the recovery process for a period up to 
12 months.  
Community 
Recovery Fund 
(CRF) 
DPCD $4 million to restore social networks and community 
facilities.  
Flood Recovery 
Community 
Infrastructure 
Fund(a) 
DSE and 
DPCD 
$8 million initiative to repair or replace community 
infrastructure on council-owned or private land.  
$22 million initiative for flood recovery works on 
Crown land managed by DSE 
Rural Coordination 
Officers 
DPI $0.5 million initiative to appoint nine rural 
coordination officers (RCO) to coordinate and 
respond to rural farm issues in 10 LGAs for six 
months.  
(a) DSE was responsible for managing and administering the fund for projects on Crown land. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from departmental documents. 
In addition to the community relief and recovery activities, a major part of local council 
restoration efforts was towards the rebuilding of major infrastructure such as roads, 
bridges, culverts, levees and other related infrastructure. 
The process for funding the restoration and rebuilding of this infrastructure was 
managed by DTF, with VicRoads vetting projects. 
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Local Government Clean Up Fund 
The three severely affected councils visited for this audit were satisfied with the 
implementation and management of the Local Government Clean Up Fund (LGCUF). 
LGCUF provided some of the worst affected local councils with immediate cash flow to 
start their clean-up activities. 
The worst affected councils received initial funding of $100 000 each to undertake 
clean-up and rebuilding activities with a further proportional funding allocation 
determined by the severity of flood damage suffered. 
The LGCUF was effectively designed and administered. It combined the early issue of 
initial funds to allow clean-up to get started followed by a more considered 
submissions-based second funding round. Acquittals were required for all funding 
received. It was monitored by senior DPCD management through the provision of 
briefings during critical phases of the program. LGCUF was fully allocated by 
July 2011. 
Figure 4G shows the timeline for LGCUF implementation. 
  Figure 4G
Timeline for the Local Government Clean Up Fund 
Date Event Cash flow 
Early January 2010 Flood events NA 
Middle January 2011 Initiative approved and Treasurer contacted to 
request funding 
$5 million 
Late 
January/February 
2011 
First round notional allocation of $100 000 each 
provided to 16 of the most severely affected LGAs 
–$1.6 million 
End of March 2011 Minister writes to the LGAs about further funding – 
May 2011  Submissions received from LGAs for second 
round funding 
– 
June 2011 Second round notional allocation of $50 000 or 
$100 000 
–$2.2 million 
June 2011 Second round proportional allocation based on the 
relative impact and the funding shortfall 
submissions provided by LGAs 
–$1.1 million 
June 2011 Contingency fund of $100 000 allocated and 
initiative is fully implemented  
–$0.1 million 
July/August 2011 Acquittals received from the LGAs.  – 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from DPCD documentation. 
Flood Recovery Officers  
The councils that audit visited considered the FRO initiative was valuable to their 
recovery effort. The councils received either $60 000 or $120 000 in funding, 
depending on the length of the FRO’s appointment. The initiative was managed by 
DPCD through RDV and was wholly state funded.  
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FROs were appointed to selected councils based on the estimate of physical damage 
and the number of individuals that had received emergency grants. Smaller LGAs with 
less capacity were given a higher priority. The FROs played a vital role in the 
community relief activities at the councils where they were employed. Activities 
included: 
x holding community relief and recovery workshops 
x being the conduit for communications between the community and council  
x providing information on the various initiatives available to the community 
x preparing application forms for programs such as the CRF and Flood Recovery 
Community Infrastructure Fund (FRCIF) 
x liaising with and attending regional recovery committees. 
Funding for FROs was extended for 10 councils. Issues with the administration of the 
program included: 
x a delay in funding 
x uncertainty over the term of funding for the program. 
x availability of appropriately qualified and experienced staff for the FRO positions 
x a lack of clear guidance from DPCD about the role that the FRO was meant to 
perform.  
In its submission to the government's Green Paper on emergency management, the 
Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV) highlighted the issue of funding delay. LGAs 
reported more than four months delay in the provision of FRO funding following the 
floods, when communities had greatest need. The MAV also highlighted the burden 
created for councils by having to make repeated submissions for funding. 
There was also a lack of collaboration between departments offering worker funding 
which exacerbated the fragmentation created by so many programs. 
Loddon Shire was offered 12 months funding for an FRO, a further six months funding 
for a rural coordination officer (RCO) and—much later—a further allocation from DPCD 
for a volunteer coordinator. The council rolled the first two allocations into one to 
employ a full-time FRO for a longer time period and has yet to apply the volunteer 
coordination funding.  
The FRO program did not take into account skills shortages in regional and rural 
Victoria. Often, appropriately qualified and experienced staff were not available locally, 
and staff from outside the area were unlikely to be attracted to short-term positions. 
Overall, although the FRO program was successful and valuable to the communities in 
which it was implemented. However, feedback from the councils and the evaluation 
conducted by DPCD indicates that a template position description would have provided 
councils with better direction about how the FRO position could best be used. 
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Community Recovery Fund 
The $4 million Floods CRF was set up by DPCD in January 2011 to support: 
x community recovery, community development and capacity building for the future 
x activities that help restore community infrastructure and social networks and 
functioning. 
The CRF funding was allocated through a combination of a: 
x base amount, plus an allocation based on severity of impact, to flood-affected 
communities on a municipal basis 
x community small grants program for activities of $5 000 or less 
x strategic reserve. 
An application for CRF funding had to be assessed at a regional and 
inter-departmental level and by a panel of representatives from the state and 
Commonwealth governments. 
The complex governance structures and approval processes made application 
arduous and caused long wait times for decisions. 
All three councils visited for the audit found the process of applying for the CRF 
frustrating and complex. For example, to run a community event, budgeted at 
approximately $1 000, the Shire of Campaspe community had to wait more than two 
months while the funding application progressed through the CRF governance 
framework. 
DPCD commissioned a review of the implementation of the CRF in May 2012. The 
report was delivered in August 2012.  
Key points from the review include: 
x delivery of recovery projects under CRF were dependent on resources available 
through another program, the FRO program—not all councils received FRO 
allocation and so could not take advantage of the CRF.   
x information about the CRF and guidelines should be more readily available.  
x promotion of the CRF by DPCD should be improved. 
Although not designed to work in conjunction, in reality there was an interdependency 
between the CRF and FRO programs as the FRO was needed to deliver the CRF 
program. This highlights the problems in coordination across a complex suite of 
programs and the need for better collaboration.  
It is commendable that DPCD conducted a thorough evaluation of this program. It 
should implement the recommendations of that review to inform similar future 
programs. 
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Flood Recovery Community Infrastructure Fund  
The FRCIF was a joint initiative of DPCD and DSE to support the restoration and 
replacement of community infrastructure assets to flood-affected LGAs.  
Eligible community infrastructure assets included: 
x town halls 
x sport and recreation facilities 
x caravan and camping facilities 
x public parks and reserves and walking tracks. 
DSE was responsible for administering projects for assets on Crown land reserves 
managed by committees of management. DPCD administered projects where assets 
were council or privately-owned and operated by community organisations. 
LGAs experienced differences in how the two departments delivered the program. 
For example, the Northern Grampians Shire Council had to submit four separate 
applications for four projects to DSE—$207 500 for the tennis club, $219 000 for the 
memorial park, $187 000 for the bowling club and $133 500 for a recreational reserve. 
However, it only had to submit one application totalling $571 570 for six separate 
projects to DPCD. 
DSE has advised that that the FRICF program for Crown land could not be packaged 
by LGA as the various Crown land parcels were managed by legislatively appointed 
committees of management. However, councils were able to act legally as the agent of 
multiple small committees of management. Councils applied for and received funds on 
behalf of those committees. In these cases, it is not clear why streamlined 
arrangements were not put in place.  
From a community access perspective, differences in departmental application and 
documentation requirements for the FRCIF program were cumbersome which led to 
increased administration and confusion for already stretched council staff.  
Rural Coordination Officers 
The RCO initiative was established to coordinate volunteers to help with the clean-up 
and repair of fences for flood-affected farmers and to coordinate rural and agricultural 
issues. A similar program was run by DPI after the 2009 bushfires. 
On receipt of a council application accompanied by a position description, councils 
were funded $60 000 each to appoint an RCO for an initial period of six months. The 
councils had a degree of latitude in how they used the RCOs. RCO start dates varied 
from April to September 2011, with a significant proportion starting in June or July.  
At the expiry of their initial six-month term, the RCOs in Buloke and Gannawarra were 
extended for six months. As noted above, short-term position funding creates 
problems—it increases the administrative burden on councils to again formally request 
for further funding, it is harder to attract appropriately qualified and experienced staff 
for short periods, and it works against medium- to longer-term planning. The issue of 
poor long-term planning for recovery is identified in this audit.  
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An external evaluation of the FRO and RCO programs commissioned by DPCD found 
the RCOs to be highly valued by the councils and the broader community and that they 
were, along with the FROs, a catalyst for action.  
Similarly to the evaluation of the FRO program, the RCO review suggested that the 
development of a template position description for the RCO position would be useful 
for future programs.  
Recommendations 
4. The Department of Premier and Cabinet should develop clear guidelines for 
departments in designing community disaster relief and recovery programs. 
5. Rural Finance Corporation (Department of Treasury and Finance) and Regional 
Development Victoria should coordinate any future disaster relief and recovery 
programs for businesses. 
6. Regional Development Victoria should implement the recommendations from the 
Department of Planning and Community Development's review of the Community 
Recovery Fund to improve the delivery of relief and recovery programs in the 
future. 
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5 Monitoring and evaluating relief and recovery 
At a glance 
Background  
Robust and systematic monitoring and evaluation of flood relief and recovery initiatives 
is necessary to identify lessons learnt and to measure effectiveness.   
Conclusion 
Victoria has met the Commonwealth's monitoring and reporting requirements under the 
National Partnership Agreement (NPA) but has not met financial reporting obligations 
under the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA). Delivery of 
flood relief and recovery actions has been adequately monitored by the Secretaries’ 
Flood Recovery Group (SFRG).  
No whole-of-government evaluation of relief and recovery activities has been 
undertaken to date, making it harder for lessons learnt to be applied in future. 
Findings  
x The state has provided comprehensive and timely monitoring reports to meet 
requirements under the NPA. 
x Victoria has not met its financial reporting requirements under NDRRA, as it is yet 
to provide an acquittal of funds spent in respect of the 2010–11 floods. 
x As part of the NPA, the state's Flood Recovery Work Plan required a 
comprehensive evaluation of the recovery phase of the 2010–11 floods. To date 
there has been no overarching framework and methodology to guide evaluation 
of individual programs or the overall recovery effort.   
x The SFRG intends to evaluate the relief and recovery effort in the latter part of 
2013, using the Department of Human Services developed program evaluation 
framework and guidelines.  
Recommendations 
The Department of Premier and Cabinet should lead: 
x the development of an evaluation framework, based on work undertaken to date 
by the Department of Human Services to assess the impact of relief and recovery 
programs in the recent floods and in future disaster events 
x an evaluation of the impact of relief and recovery programs in the recent floods, 
using this framework. 
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5.1 Background 
Continuous monitoring and reporting on flood relief and recovery initiatives is 
necessary for timely, co-ordinated and decisive action to mitigate risks or any barriers 
to successful progress.  
Evaluating the entire flood relief and recovery effort including governance is important 
to identify lessons learnt and gauge overall impact and effectiveness of programs. A 
systematic approach is required to use those lessons to inform strategies and actions, 
to better prepare for recovery in future emergency situations. 
5.2 Conclusion 
Victoria has met its monitoring and reporting requirements under the National 
Partnership Agreement (NPA). Monitoring and reporting mechanisms were sufficient to 
oversight and manage the most pressing issues faced by local councils and 
communities. Of the 15 initiatives examined, acquittal monitoring and reporting has 
been timely and appropriate. However, Victoria not yet acquitted its financial reporting 
requirements under the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA). 
It is important for government to know what has worked well and where improvements 
need to be made. Conducting an overarching evaluation and incorporating lessons 
learnt into future planning would assist government to better support communities and 
know where to best target its resources for future emergency events. 
The state committed to evaluating the recovery phase and actions identified in its 
Flood Recovery Work Plan (The Work Plan). This audit was advised that the 
Secretaries’ Flood Recovery Group (SFRG) intends to implement the Department of 
Human Services (DHS) evaluation framework for relief and recovery programs and 
conduct a whole-of-government evaluation in the latter part of 2013. However, this 
framework will need to be adapted so that it can be applied to all relief and recovery 
programs, not just those administered by DHS. 
5.3 Monitoring and reporting  
Flood relief and recovery initiatives need to be monitored and reported consistently 
and regularly to enable: 
x the state to meet Commonwealth NPA and NDRRA requirements 
x departments and agencies to report to flood relief and recovery governance 
committees on recovery issues and barriers to progress 
x councils to report to the state as part of the NPA and NDDRA acquittal 
requirements and to departments on the progress of initiatives and acquittal for 
funding provided. 
Key elements of this reporting relate to: 
x financial data—claims, acquittals against funding, advances 
x operational data—service and grant utilisation, recovery issue identification and 
management, impact data, program delivery and acquittal reporting.  
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5.3.1 Reporting to the Commonwealth 
The NPA for Victorian Flood Reconstruction and Recovery commenced on  
10 May 2011 and is due to expire on 30 June 2014. The NPA acts in conjunction with 
the NDRRA, which is the key mechanism for the Commonwealth to support the states 
after a natural disaster. 
Under the NPA, Victoria must report progress against outcomes specified in the Work 
Plan monthly for a period of six months. The frequency and form of reporting after that 
was to be agreed and based on milestones and initiatives identified in the Work Plan, 
which was finalised in September 2011. The NPA also requires reporting on: 
x progress with expenditure under the NDRRA, including advice on the level of 
expenditure in key areas of the reconstruction effort 
x revisions to estimates of costs 
x progress against the recovery plans of the most severely affected communities 
as agreed by Victoria and the Commonwealth, including the extent to which 
milestones are being achieved. 
Victoria has met NPA reporting requirements through the Department of Treasury and 
Finance's monthly Flood Recovery Performance Report. The report contains the 
number of—and expenditure on—household, business and primary producer grants 
and loans, business and local government funds, infrastructure repairs and other flood 
recovery programs established by government. 
The Department of Treasury and Finance developed a framework to meet the NPA 
reporting requirements and commenced reporting in June 2011. This allowed for timely 
and comprehensive reporting. The first annual review of the NPA conducted in August 
2012, by the National Disaster Recovery Taskforce and representatives of the SFRG 
found that '…overall, both parties have met their respective and shared performance 
monitoring and reporting requirements.'  
Under the NDRRA arrangements, Victoria is required to provide audited financial 
statements to support claims, including subsequent spending against any advance 
payments. The NDRRA guidelines require these statements to be audited by the 
Victorian Auditor-General's Office (VAGO). Victoria has not met its financial reporting 
requirements under NDRRA, as it is yet to provide an acquittal of funds spent in 
respect of the 2010–11 floods. 
5.3.2 Statewide monitoring and reporting  
In addition to the monthly Flood Recovery Performance Report, the SFRG monitored 
recovery progress through: 
x Place-based reporting of the most urgent issues, with strategies and actions to 
address the issue, as well as anticipated residual gaps.   
x Stream-based reporting and tracking of key issues by portfolio—agriculture, 
business recovery and community assets, health and human services and natural 
environment and transport. 
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Place-based and stream-based reporting took a similar approach—highlighting the 
issues that were most pressing and addressing those as a matter of priority. With the 
widespread damage and continued movement of the flood waters across the state, this 
approach enabled a more rapid response to issues and flexibility where required.   
However, the reports did not provide sufficient detail to understand how actions would 
be implemented, or a clear indication that the strategies/plans to address the issue had 
worked. 
5.3.3 Monitoring of department initiatives  
Departments' monitoring mechanisms for each initiative varied. Overall, departments 
have applied adequate acquittal processes according to the type of initiative, which 
includes: 
x grants and loans to businesses and primary producers acquitted using invoices 
and receipts 
x recovery support worker funding, such as the Flood Recovery Officer (FRO), 
acquitted by councils through submission of employment contracts, 
advertisements, and submission of an evaluation of flood recovery for their 
respective municipality 
x councils acquitting recovery projects, such as the Community Recovery Fund, 
through the provision of signed invoices to the responsible department. 
5.3.4 Reporting by local government 
Local councils reported directly to each department and then departments reported to 
the SFRG on the progress, take-up and funding used for initiatives.   
Initially, this reporting process was cumbersome and administratively time consuming, 
requiring councils to report the same or similar funding and service data to different 
departments. In November 2011, the Department of Primary Industries (DPI) 
implemented a web-based portal which enabled the generation of monthly scorecards 
to provide SFRG with key data by each council. 
This has streamlined data administration processes for councils as well as improved 
data reporting at a state level. The portal has been well received by departments and 
local governments. It can form the basis of an efficient reporting system following 
future emergency events. 
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5.4 Evaluating flood relief and recovery  
Evaluating relief and recovery activities and the governance systems that support 
planning and delivery is important. It helps to continuously improve emergency and 
recovery management and to better assist flood affected communities, both now and in 
the future.   
5.4.1 Good practice evaluation for relief and recovery 
A systematic, centralised evaluation based on a rigorous and clearly defined approach 
would enable the government to assess the extent to which its governance 
arrangements and selected programs and initiatives helped communities to recover.   
The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) developed a set of benchmarks for 
community recovery to inform the 2012 Victorian Emergency Management Reform: 
White Paper (the White Paper), as described in Figure 5A. These benchmarks are 
based on the Australian National Principles for Disaster Recovery and include the 
requirement for robust evaluation of initiatives and that documented lessons learnt are 
used to build capacity and prepare for future community relief and recovery programs. 
  Figure 5A
Benchmarks for community recovery 
x Appropriateness—recovery assistance to disaster impacted individuals and families 
reflect an understanding of the community context, and the complex and dynamic 
nature of emergencies and communities. 
x Community-led—successful recovery is responsive and flexible, engaging 
communities and empowering them to move forward. 
x Coordinated—successful recovery requires a planned, coordinated and adaptive 
approach with clearly articulated decision-making structure and roles 
x Effectively communicated—successful recovery is built on clear and relevant 
communication to, and feedback from, affected communities, individuals and 
organisations. 
x Acknowledging and building capacity—successful recovery recognises, supports 
and builds on community, individual and organisational capacity. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from the Department of Premier and Cabinet's May 
2012 submission in response to the Emergency Management Green Paper. 
These benchmarks can be used in an evaluation framework to guide evaluation of 
individual programs as well as the relief and recovery effort overall.  
5.4.2 Evaluation at a state level  
The state's Flood Recovery Work Plan committed to a comprehensive evaluation of 
the recovery phase of the 2010–11 floods including evaluation of Work Plan actions. 
There have been evaluations of: 
x some individual programs 
x DHS's coordination of emergency relief and recovery 
x the Whole-of-Victorian-Government Communication Strategy. 
However, there was no whole-of-government evaluation of relief and recovery 
programs, and there was no framework in place to guide such an evaluation.  
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In June 2012, DHS endorsed a framework and guidelines for evaluation of relief and 
recovery programs managed by Health and Human Services Emergency Management 
(HHSEM). It includes benchmarks based on the Australian National Principles for 
Disaster Recovery and is largely consistent with those developed by DPC and set out 
in Figure 5A. Both DPC and DHS propose evaluation frameworks which would include: 
x real-time evaluations during emergency events 
x lessons learnt exercises 
x recovery program monitoring 
x recovery program evaluations.  
The DHS framework provides process guidance and a methodology for evaluating 
performance and suggested benchmarks. It was clearly designed for DHS to use at a 
regional and state level.  
This audit has been advised that the SFRG intends to use this framework to evaluate 
the whole-of-government relief and recovery effort in the latter part of 2013. The 
framework will need to be adapted to be used for a recovery evaluation across multiple 
departments. 
The intended timing of evaluation—well after the majority of programs have been 
delivered—means that it is likely that important information will not be captured. This is 
a serious shortcoming. 
In addition, there has been no central data collation and analysis from evaluations, nor 
has there been a consistent methodology and approach applied to enable a 
reasonable picture of performance to be formed. In the absence of a broader 
evaluation, there has been no assessment of how programs worked together, whether 
synergies were achieved, or if there were overlaps and gaps. 
The 2012 White Paper states that evaluation will form part of the portfolio of the yet to 
be established Inspector General for Emergency Management (IGEM). 
As outlined in the White Paper, this role will focus on performance monitoring, 
assurance and continuous improvement related to the response and planning phases 
of emergency management. However, there is no specific reference to performance 
monitoring, review and evaluation of recovery arrangements and activities. It is 
therefore not evident how lessons learnt will be incorporated into future planning 
priorities for recovery.  
The White Paper makes no reference to a formal evaluation framework being 
developed and applied in the future. It identifies an action to work with communities to 
develop an approach for evaluating programs and initiatives. Although community input 
to an overarching evaluation approach is important, it is only one element needed to 
build a sound framework. It will be important for future reforms arising from the White 
Paper to include a rigorous approach to evaluation.  
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5.4.3 Department-led evaluation 
Some specific flood relief and recovery issues and initiatives evaluated by departments 
include: 
x the emergency relief coordination, the psychosocial recovery support program 
and the whole-of-government flood recovery communications — DHS 
x agriculture flood response and recovery program, the rural coordination officer 
program and the rural financial counselling service — DPI 
x FRO and the community recovery fund programs — the Department of Planning 
and Community Development (DPCD). 
The results are summarised in Figure 5B. 
  Figure 5B
Summary of departmental evaluations  
Emergency relief coordination (DHS) – June 2011 
Evaluation of emergency relief and coordination activities between 12 January and 25 
February 2011 found that:  
x regional structures and networks worked well  
x established relationships with the community contributed positively  
x the lack of systems and processes contributed to a lack of clarity in roles and 
responsibilities between DHS and the Red Cross 
x the lack of established relationships between central and regional staff reduced 
timeliness of response which compromised information being reported further up the 
line and the coordination of emergency relief. 
Psychosocial recovery support program (DHS) – October 2011 
Recommended earlier availability of flood support workers, better coordination with other 
agencies and local government and greater communication about the support available.  
Whole-of-government 2010–11 flood recovery communications (DHS) – February 
2012 
Focused mainly on the feedback from government staff at a central and regional level, and 
had limited involvement with flood-affected communities. Involving communities more 
widely may have captured information more comprehensively on the extent to which public 
information was sufficiently targeted, accessible and relevant. Broader community 
involvement may also have helped identify the information required for longer–term 
recovery. Identified improvements to communication include: 
x during initial recovery, more two–way communication is needed and more emphasis on 
quality, not quantity of information 
x for ongoing recovery, increased community engagement and reminders about grants 
and assistance for individuals and businesses that may not have accessed these earlier. 
Flood response and recovery – Agricultural Recovery Framework (DPI) – April 2012 
Overall coordination and administration of DPI's flood response and recovery for the 
agriculture sector worked well. Improvements focused on standardisation of recovery plan 
documents, streamlining its reporting system and reporting recovery activities and 
stakeholder management and resourcing. 
FRO and Rural Coordination Officer (DPCD and DPI) – March 2012 
Evaluation of the FRO and Rural Coordination Officer initiatives showed a positive impact 
on the recovery process. This was attributed to allowing councils relative autonomy on how 
best to use the officers.   
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Figure 5B 
Summary of departmental evaluations – continued 
Community Recovery Fund (DPCD) – August 2012 
The broader issues identified in this review include: 
x multiple information points and provision of conflicting advice by government 
departments on available recovery assistance 
x prior to the web portal, councils were required to submit flood impact, recovery activity 
and program acquittal data to multiple collection points, creating a significant 
administrative burden 
x timing of recovery program roll-out should better align with need and the department 
should better inform communities of likely areas of funding and thereby manage 
expectations.  
The review found other issues related to program administration and communication: 
x application approval processes were overly bureaucratic and lengthy 
x feedback on rejected proposals was not consistently provided to help with later 
proposals 
x there was conflicting advice on project proposals by DPCD central and regional staff 
and limited regional resources to support the effective and efficient delivery of the fund 
x promotion of the fund could be improved and provide readily accessible guidance  
x inadequate communication processes in the Community Recovery Fund (CRF) 
governance structure led to incorrect assumptions by councils regarding the application 
process 
x there were multiple agreements from different funding rounds to the same 
organisations, all requiring acquittal 
x a lack of clarity relating to the regional structure, roles and responsibilities following 
Regional Development Victoria's integration with the DPCD. 
Financial Counselling Service (DPI) – January 2013 
Existing counsellors were extended for the period of the floods. The service had a positive impact 
on the rural community. A final program evaluation report is due by 30 July 2013. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from departmental documentation. 
It is positive that the evaluations and reviews summarised in Figure 5B were 
conducted, however, there is a lack of consistent methodology on evaluations 
undertaken. A consistent and rigorous approach would have better enabled 
conclusions to be drawn about relief and recovery efforts, based on assessing the set 
of evaluations together. The process for incorporating improvements and lessons 
learnt is not apparent.  
5.4.4 Local government evaluation of state-delivered relief 
and recovery initiatives 
In addition to the department-led evaluations, local government councils conducted 
evaluations of the state-delivered flood recovery initiatives. Analysis of evaluations by 
the local government councils is presented in Appendix C. 
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The audit visited three local government councils that were very adversely affected by 
the 2010–11 floods. There were some common themes raised in the evaluations 
undertaken by local government, audit's council visits and the department-led 
evaluations. These themes are: 
x No single point of communication for information—particularly in relation to 
financial assistance, including improved clarity of information. 
x Grant availability and eligibility criteria—there was confusion regarding who 
was eligible for grants with barriers to take-up, including for businesses not 
physically damaged by flood waters but affected by business downturn. Low 
interest loans criteria excluded the businesses most likely to need the loan. 
Farmers had to derive 51 per cent of their income from their farms to be eligible 
for grants, but years of drought meant that many had sought additional sources of 
income outside their farms, to stay afloat, thus excluding them from grants.  
x Application approval processes overly bureaucratic and lengthy. 
x Release of case support and counselling service funding too slow. 
x Inaccuracy of impact data. 
x Duplication of information collected across agencies—agency information 
sharing prior to the use of the web portal for reporting was poor and added to the 
administrative load on local councils. 
5.5 Relief and recovery lessons learnt  
Victoria has experienced a rise in the frequency, scale and impact of natural disasters 
over recent years. 
The systematic capture and incorporation of lessons learnt from previous events is 
critical for better preparation for future events and to continuously improve systems, 
processes and approaches to community recovery. The DHS evaluation framework 
includes a process for recording evaluation recommendations and incorporating those 
lessons into future planning. An opportunity exists for this to be applied more widely. 
5.5.1 Review of flood warnings and response  
The Review of 2010–11 Flood Warnings and Response (The Comrie Review), 
published in December 2011 identifies a range of improvements needed to assist local 
government and community recovery.  
While the report has a broader emergency management focus, identified 
improvements are consistent with the findings of this audit. These improvements relate 
to: 
x Rapid Impact Assessment (RIA)—absence of timely and accurate information, 
little understanding of the primary purpose of the RIA, different systems used by 
agencies to collect and analyse data, difficulties in getting access to timely and 
accurate data to plan and prioritise, and ownership and responsibility for the RIA. 
The Comrie Review noted that coordination of the RIA and the exchange of 
information was disorganised with some communities subject to multiple 
assessments 
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x Financial Assistance— confusion over the availability of financial assistance to 
deal with the repair and clean-up; problems with access to information on grants 
and assistance for individuals, businesses and primary producers; and no 
ownership of problems by state agencies 
x Betterment— confusion and lack of clarity and information with regard to policy, 
processes and criteria for betterment funding—all of which led to a delay in local 
government applying for betterment funding and progressing recovery activity. 
5.5.2 Government response to the Comrie Review 
In November 2012, the government issued a response to the Comrie Review, 
specifically with regard to improving the flood warning systems implementation plan 
recommendations one to 30 and recommendation 86 of the Comrie Review. There 
were 93 recommendations in total, leaving 62 not yet responded to by the government. 
The Premier informed Parliament on 8 December 2011 that ‘The Government accepts 
these recommendations…in whole, in part and in principle’ However, there has been 
no further government response on 62 recommendations and it is not evident how 
recommendations from the Comrie Review regarding local government recovery have 
been used to inform the White Paper. 
The White Paper responds in part to other issues raised in the Comrie Review, 
however, particular recommendations regarding local government and community 
recovery have not been completely addressed. The Department of Justice has advised 
that recommendations will inform future emergency management changes and 
activities. It is imperative that these recommendations, and the issues they illustrate, 
are not overlooked and that they are incorporated into future recovery planning and 
practices.  
 Recommendations   
7. The Department of Premier and Cabinet should lead: 
x the development of an evaluation framework, based on work undertaken to 
date by the Department of Human Services, to be used in assessing the 
impact of relief and recovery programs in the recent floods and in future 
disaster events 
x an evaluation of the impact of relief and recovery programs in the recent 
floods, using this framework. 
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Appendix A. 
 Governance arrangements: 2010–11 Victorian flood 
recovery 
Secretaries' Flood Recovery Group 
Purpose  
The Secretaries' Flood Recovery Group (SFRG) was set up to provide the necessary 
authority for rapid, coordinated and high quality recovery actions by the Victorian 
Public Sector and provide coordinated advice to Cabinet and the Ministerial Flood 
Recovery Taskforce. 
Membership  
Departmental secretaries and agency heads from: 
• Department of Business and Innovation (DBI)  
• Department of Education and Early Childhood Development (DEECD)  
• Department of Human Services (DHS) 
• Department of Justice (DoJ) 
• Department of Planning and Community Development (DPCD) 
• Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) 
• Department of Primary Industries (DPI) 
• Department of Sustainability and the Environment (DSE) 
• Department of Transport (DoT)  
• Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) 
• Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner (OESC) 
• Victoria Police 
• VicRoads 
The Secretaries of DHS and DPI co-chaired the SFRG. 
Roles and responsibilities  
• Provide strategic leadership and coordination of the work of government 
agencies in flood recovery actions. 
• Lead a whole-of-government, coordinated development of flood recovery 
initiatives for consideration by the Flood Recovery Ministerial Taskforce (FRMT), 
the Security and Emergencies Committee (SEC) and the Budget and Expenditure 
Review Committee (BERC). 
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• Inform the government’s FRMT and SEC of flood impacts and the flood recovery 
actions by departments, including progress of implemented actions and 
recommended additional recovery actions. 
• Identify medium- and long-term issues to be addressed, together with 
recommended initiatives, to enable communities, business and the environment 
to recover from the flood events. 
• Recommend to government any medium- and long-term policy initiatives to 
facilitate flood recovery for businesses, communities and the environment. 
• Engage with local communities, authorities and businesses regarding strategies 
and progress for flood recovery in the short, medium and long terms. 
• Receive progress reports from each secretary whose agency leads recovery of 
one or more specific streams—agriculture, business, community assets, health, 
environment, transport—and major affected places—Mildura, Carisbrook, 
Charlton, Gannawarra/Loddon, Grampians, Creswick and Wilsons Promontory. 
• Evaluate the effectiveness of flood recovery initiatives. 
• Establish a risk management strategy for the flood recovery to inform current and 
future actions.  
The SFRG was to be supported by two recovery teams, the Flood Emergency 
Recovery Team (FERT)—reporting to the secretary of DHS—and the Flood Economic 
and Environmental Recovery Team (FEERT)—reporting to the secretary of DPI 
Flood Economic and Environmental Recovery 
Team 
Purpose 
Assist SFRG to address the medium and long-term planning and implementation of 
economic and environment issues. 
Membership  
FEERT was to comprise members from DPC, DTF, DPCD (including Regional 
Development Victoria (RDV) and Local Government Victoria (LGV)), DBI, DSE, DPI, 
DoT/VicRoads with DPI providing secretariat assistance. 
Flood Emergency Recovery Team  
Purpose 
FERT was to be the central point for the social dimensions of flood recovery and 
coordinate assistance for households and communities, and coordinate whole-of-
government communication. 
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Membership  
FERT was led by DHS as lead recovery agency outlined in the State Emergency 
Recovery Plan. The team comprised recovery leaders nominated from relevant 
departments and agencies, in particular DPC, DTF, DPCD (including RDV and LGV), 
DBI and DPI.  
Flood Recovery Coordination Group 
Purpose 
The Flood Recovery Co-ordination Group (FRCG) was to be the forum for leaders from 
FEERT and FERT, together with the agency recovery leaders, to take a coordinated 
and collaborative approach to recovery. The FRCG was to be chaired by the State 
Flood Recovery Coordinator. 
Membership 
The full membership of the FRCG was to include recovery leaders nominated from 
relevant departments and agencies, in particular DPC, DTF, DPCD/RDV/LGV, DBI, 
DPI, DHS, DoT, who were responsible for contributions to each of the two Recovery 
Teams.  
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Appendix B. 
Commonwealth funding 
arrangements 
National Partnership Agreement – May 2011 
In the May 2011 National Partnership Agreement (NPA) for Victorian Flood 
Reconstruction and Recovery was signed. The Commonwealth Government agreed to 
provide Victoria with financial assistance in accordance with the provisions of the 
Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA).  
Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery 
Arrangements  
NDRRA was established by the Commonwealth in 1974 to provide a basis for the 
provision of financial assistance to the states and territories for the purpose of natural 
disaster relief and recovery.  
The 2007 NDRRA Determination and subsequent 2011 NDRRA Determination set out 
these arrangements, including:  
x the types of natural disasters covered by the arrangements 
x expenditure that is eligible for partial reimbursement by the Commonwealth 
x how the amount of assistance will be calculated 
x the process for claiming assistance 
x conditions of the assistance including acquittal and audit requirements. 
The Commonwealth will fund up to 75 per cent of the assistance available to 
individuals and communities. This contribution is delivered through a number of 
NDRRA measures and may include: 
x personal hardship and distress assistance  
x counter disaster operations  
x loans for small businesses and primary producers  
x transport freight subsidies for primary producers  
x loans and grants to churches, voluntary non-profit organisations and sporting 
clubs 
x restoration or replacement of essential public assets. 
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The Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) interprets two of the NDRRA 
categories for Commonwealth-state cost sharing on a 50:50 basis. They are: 
• A—provided to individuals to alleviate personal hardship or distress arising as a 
result of a natural disaster 
• C—funding through a Community Recovery Fund to restore social networks, 
community functioning and community facilities, and recovery grants for small 
businesses and for primary producers. 
As defined by the NDRRA Determination, the co-contribution ratio for categories A and 
C are dependent upon the state meeting pre-defined expenditure thresholds.  
Under the NDRRA Determination, all expenditure must occur less than two years after 
the end of the financial year in which the emergency event occurred.  Any claims by 
councils must be submitted within this time frame. 
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Appendix C. 
Local government councils 
issues analysis 
Common themes in council flood recovery 
evaluations 
Local government councils with a dedicated Flood Recovery Officer (FRO) were 
required, as a condition of the FRO's role, to conduct an evaluation of flood recovery in 
their municipality.  
Common themes raised in the evaluation reports included: 
x confusion about what grants were available and who was eligible. One council 
suggested that there should be a single government department accountable for 
collating and publishing a list of financial assistance measures and eligibility 
criteria to help people determine what they were eligible for and how to get the 
assistance they needed. 
x concerns about access to grants for business and low interest loans managed by 
the Rural Finance Corporation (RFC) such as:  
x the 51 per cent income rule whereby farmers/business need to derive at 
least 51 per cent of their income from their farming enterprise to be eligible 
for this financial assistance. This prevented many farmers/business who 
supplemented farm income from income other sources from receiving this 
financial assistance and many did not receive the full amount 
x a view of some councils that the low interest loan program was not 
successful with very little uptake due to the eligibility criteria 
x financial assistance not being available to businesses that were not flooded 
but still impacted by a general downturn in trade 
x application processes being too complicated, bureaucratic and time 
consuming 
x criticism by one council of the performance of RFC in assisting farmers to 
apply for these grants 
x the size of the grant amount, which was seen as inadequate. 
x the hold-up in the release of funding for case support and counselling services 
funded by the Department of Human Services (DHS) which delayed the 
recruitment of staff and subsequent operation of services 
x the requirement for better communication between VicRoads and councils about 
road closure and repair 
x the time taken by VicRoads in repairing roads 
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• the inaccuracy of flood impact data provided by the Department of Primary 
Industries (DPI) 
• concerns about the duplication in information collected by agencies. Sharing of 
information between agencies was poor. 
What worked well and what did not 
Figure C1 
What worked well and what did not, as identified in local government council 
evaluation reports 
Issue area—Communication 
'What worked well' 
Bendigo: 
Having a designated employee to work with the rural community was key to the recovery process. The 
Rural Coordination Officer (RCO) was dedicated to flood recovery and worked closely with affected 
landholders linking them to emotional, financial and on-farm support. 
The RCO and Case Support Worker from Bendigo Community Health Service (BCHS) made over 20 
outreach visits to rural communities from January to March 2011. The visits gave residents an opportunity 
to talk about the recovery process, what support was still required, how they were coping and 
opportunities to link to services. 
The Rural Support Network, Farming Consultative Committee and regional flood recovery efforts 
coordinated by DHS were important avenues to raise rural issues and concerns, pinpoint areas for further 
action and provide information about available support services. 
'What did not work well' 
Buloke: 
Sharing of information between agencies was poor. There was no central information source and forms 
needed to be completed for each and every service. 
Outreach services provided summary data only to council, making it difficult to identify ongoing need. To 
address this, council conducted outreach services to identify gaps. This placed additional pressure on 
council staff. 
Swan Hill: 
Countless number of services offered by —council, DHS, Red Cross and Rural Finance—to support 
affected residents, was provided in many different forms. Trying to identify and apply for all services for 
which people were eligible became overwhelming and confusing; a centralised point to collect information 
was required. 
Issue area—Financial assistance 
'What worked well’ 
Bendigo: 
Many landholders applied for and receive financial assistance.  
The RCO and Rural Support Coordinator (RSC) were able to refer a number of landholders to BCHS 
Case Support Workers for assessment with regard to financial assistance. 
Campaspe: 
DHS Personal Hardship Grants were distributed very quickly to assist with immediate need. 
Financial and non-financial assistance provided by all agencies was a great support to the community. 
Loddon: 
All participants felt that the Victorian Government support was readily available and timely. 
Funding support from the Victorian and Commonwealth Governments was released in a timely manner to 
assist local governments in particular to plan and move quickly ahead with the recovery program. 
Swan Hill: 
A range of support measures were available to assist people during the recovery phase. 
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Figure C1 
What worked well and what did not, as identified in local government council 
evaluation reports – continued 
Issue area—Financial assistance – continued 
'What did not work well' 
Bendigo: 
Many landholders did not seek financial assistance because: 
• they did not know about the financial assistance opportunities available 
• they thought that it wasn’t worth their effort to apply due to perceived complicated State Government 
application processes 
• many self-assessed their eligibility and did not apply. 
There is a need for greater communication with rural landholders about the availability of financial 
assistance. 
Many landholders were not eligible for grants due to earning significant off-farm income. 
Flood damage to some houses may not have been evident immediately following the floods. As these 
impacts took some time to materialise, some landholders missed the cut-off date to apply for financial 
assistance. 
There is a genuine need to look after elderly residents and other vulnerable people following 
flood/emergency events. Locals do this well but need more support to link to services for the elderly 
following on from the flood event. 
Campaspe: 
The re-establishment and temporary living grants offered by DHS were means tested which meant that 
people missed out. 
There was a huge amount of assistance available, but it was hard for people to understand what was 
available to them and what they were eligible for. 
A single government department needs to be accountable for collating and publishing a list of financial 
assistance measures and basic eligibility criteria to help people determine what they are eligible for and 
what they need to do to get the assistance they require. 
The Victorian and Commonwealth Governments should review and revise the Natural Disaster Financial 
Assistance (NDFA) program to speed up access to funds and remove restrictions around the use of 
internal road repair crews. 
Central Goldfields: 
DHS major grant application forms were felt to be overcomplicated for people struggling with day-to-day 
management in the aftermath of a flood. 
Information about grants was also sometimes poorly disseminated by council and other agencies. 
Gannawarra: 
Multiple data collection from different agencies meant it was difficult to deliver support where it was 
needed. 
Swan Hill: 
Many people did not meet eligibility requirements for financial assistance. 
Issue area—Community events 
'What worked well’ 
Bendigo: 
Financial assistance and council support for communities to hold events was very well received by rural 
communities. 
'What did not work well' 
Mildura: 
Greater transparency and earlier distribution of Department of Planning and Community Development 
funding with the governance undertaken at a local level rather than regional.  
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Figure C1 
What worked well and what did not, as identified in local government council 
evaluation reports – continued 
Issue area—Farming and small business 
'What worked well’ 
Gannawarra: 
Recovery assistance was seen to be adequate for business and there was a quick response time. 
The assistance given by DPI was seen as a positive for agricultural businesses. 
'What did not work well' 
Buloke: 
Confusion over eligibility and claiming of the $25 000 RFC grant. Many were highly critical of the 
performance of RFC in assisting farmers to apply for these grants. 
Grants were very small when compared with the amount of damage. 
Difficult for farmers to apply for assistance. 
Need consistent information and service levels from agencies. 
Campaspe: 
Farmers who weren’t currently generating 51 per cent of their income from their farm due to the 10-year 
drought were ineligible for assistance. 
The low interest loan program was not successful with very little uptake due to the eligibility criteria. 
Some of the grant amounts offered need to be increased to be useful. Government may need to 
reconsider the dollar amounts associated with the business loss—suggested coverage of 50 per cent of 
losses as opposed to capped grant amounts. 
Businesses that were not flooded and therefore ineligible for assistance were still impacted with a general 
downturn in trade—there was no assistance available to these businesses. 
Some business leaders felt that it would have been useful for the support agencies to follow-up at the six 
month and twelve month marks to monitor recovery support and progress. 
RFC was understaffed and their model of engagement—individuals as opposed to groups—was 
inefficient and not well received. 
Rural Finance Grant application process had mixed feedback—some people felt it was too hard to 
complete, whereas others did not. 
Actual time frames and requirements to get basic level business recovery grant, for example invoice 
requirements—could be greatly improved to give faster access to funds. 
Loddon: 
RFC grants ($25 000) are a token of the cost of repair. Not many applicants received the full amount. 
For the $200 000 loans available through RFC only 17 applications were approved at an average of $87 
824. No loans were successful for small business in the Loddon Shire. 
Requirements of RFC were too bureaucratic and time consuming for applicants. 
That financial assistance be granted to all businesses that can demonstrate they are impacted by the 
disaster, not just to businesses that have been inundated. 
Mount Alexander: 
Of the 106 applications for the RFC Clean Up and Restoration Grants only 95 were approved and not all 
were eligible for the full amount of $25 000. 
Of the seven applications made through the RFC for $200 000 concessional loans, only five were 
approved to a total amount of $535 000. 
Business owners found business recovery information confusing and time consuming. 
There needs to be a one stop shop to assist businesses, too much information from too many agencies 
created confusion around who could help and what was on offer. 
Gannawarra: 
Not all property owners were eligible for RFC grants. Due to lack of access, numerous businesses were 
badly affected. 
Too much paperwork was required for RFC grants. 
Grants were not adequate and there .should be more for larger farms. 
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Figure C1 
What worked well and what did not, as identified in local government council 
evaluation reports – continued 
Issue area—Health and wellbeing 
'What worked well’ 
Campaspe: 
Flood support and counselling services were exceptionally well regarded once they got up and running. 
Changes in demand for services were well managed as was the relationship between Rochester and 
Elmore District Health Service and the Departments of Human Services and Health. 
Department of Human Services (DHS) funded initiatives such as Red Cross outreach and community 
psychosocial support was well received. 
Loddon: 
DHS funded community psychosocial sessions assisting many in the community. 
DHS funded Case Support services. This was a very useful resource for helping affected people deal with 
their many issues and linking them in with counselling, grants and financial services. 
The Flood Recovery Manager was a timely and valuable addition to the recovery team. The role helped 
bring all the recovery effort together and provided a focal point for recovery. 
Mount Alexander: 
The flood support workers were a fantastic resource. 
'What did not work well' 
Buloke: 
Case Support Services were not on the ground in Buloke until May 2011, some 4 months after the event. 
Earlier provision of these services would have provided much needed support. 
Need more evenly distributed access to services across the municipality. Perceived to be very focused on 
Charlton. 
Timing of these activities needs to be appropriate for the community. 
Campaspe: 
Funding for flood support workers was slow to be released and delayed operationalisation of the service. 
DHS should have a pre-approved budget for case support and counselling to be able to roll out a service 
very early on. Also, DHS should prepare as much case support material (such as position descriptions) as 
possible in advance to ensure that the services have standard templates to work from. 
Issue area—Infrastructure recovery 
'What worked well’ 
Campaspe: 
The community received a range of grants covering many important recovery projects. 
'What did not work well' 
Buloke: 
Better communications are needed between VicRoads and the Buloke Shire on road closures and better 
understanding of which roads are the responsibility of VicRoads. 
Campaspe:  
The community needs a better understanding of who is responsible for various projects to help them 
understand all of the agencies involved in flood recovery. 
Road repair has appeared to be too slow. 
Loddon: 
Some infrastructure repair issues were raised at the public evaluation session both for VicRoads and 
Loddon Shire road networks; for example, road closures and repairs. 
VicSES was overwhelmed and unable to fully respond to all built environment issues across the Shire. 
The current NDRRA rules allow for reinstatement works to current standards and not betterment of 
existing infrastructure even though betterment would benefit the whole community in the long term. 
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Figure C1 
What worked well and what did not, as identified in local government council 
evaluation reports – continued 
Issue area—Infrastructure recovery – continued 
'What did not work well' – continued 
Gannawarra: 
Participants noted a slow response from VicRoads to repair roads and the lack of communication from 
VicRoads. 
Long delays in repairing VicRoad roads.  
Lack of communication from Vic Roads as to when roads were to be fixed. 
Issue area—Recovery funding for local council   
'What did not work well' 
Campaspe: 
State Government funding bodies to provide clear information on recovery expenditure requirements. 
They should build a set of case studies that show best practice and permissible uses of the funding. In 
assessing grant applications, let the local knowledge decide how best to spend the funding.  
Consistency of reporting requirements from all agencies for grants is also required. 
Issue area —Natural environment  
'What worked well’ 
Mount Alexander: 
The cooperation of other agencies such as Goulburn Murray Water, Department of Sustainability and 
Environment and Parks Victoria were well received by Council staff. 
'What did not work well' 
Mount Alexander: 
There is a lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities of agencies in regard to repairs to the Natural 
Environment following a natural disaster.  
A clear and concise response and recovery model for agencies to deal with issues that may impact the 
natural environment following a disaster. A model needs to be developed and agreed to by all parties to 
ensure that the appropriate authorities are dealing with issues within their service portfolio. 
Issue area—Impact assessment  
'What did not work well’ 
Bendigo: 
DPI’s flood impact data was based on Property Identification Code (PIC) numbers which only indicate that 
a rural landholder runs stock as their major enterprise so this data set did not capture flood impacts to 
other types of farming enterprises. 
Buloke: 
Data collection was poor regarding crop, livestock and infrastructure loss. Although the DPI gathered 
some data, it was based on PIC numbers. Properties that did not have livestock were not contacted. It is 
difficult to provide evidence of damage and the scale of the flood impact without this data. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from local government council flood recovery evaluations. 
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Appendix D. 
Audit Act 1994 section 16—
submissions and comments 
 
Introduction 
In accordance with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report was 
provided to the departments of Premier and Cabinet, Treasury and Finance, 
Sustainability and Environment, Primary Industries, Justice, Business and Innovation, 
Human Services, and Planning and Community Development with a request for 
submissions or comments. 
Relevant extracts from the report were also provided to the three councils where field 
work was conducted for this audit, in order to confirm the accuracy of information used.  
These were—Loddon Shire Council, Campaspe Shire Council and Northern 
Grampians Shire Council. 
The submission and comments provided are not subject to audit nor the evidentiary 
standards required to reach an audit conclusion. Responsibility for the accuracy, 
fairness and balance of those comments rests solely with the agency head. 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Environment and Primary 
Industries and the Acting Secretary, Department of Human Services 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Environment and Primary 
Industries and the Acting Secretary, Department of Human Services – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Environment and Primary 
Industries and the Acting Secretary, Department of Human Services – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Environment and Primary 
Industries and the Acting Secretary, Department of Human Services – continued 
 
 
 

Auditor-General’s reports 
Reports tabled during 2012–13 
 
Report title Date tabled 
Carer Support Programs (2012–13:1) August 2012 
Investment Attraction (2012–13:2) August 2012 
Fare Evasion on Public Transport (2012–13:3) August 2012 
Programs for Students with Special Learning Needs (2012–13:4)  August 2012 
Energy Efficiency in the Health Sector (2012–13:5) September 2012 
Consumer Participation in the Health System (2012–13:6) October 2012 
Managing Major Projects (2012–13:7) October 2012 
Collections Management in Cultural Agencies (2012–13:8) October 2012 
Effectiveness of Compliance Activities: Departments of Primary Industries and 
Sustainability and Environment (2012–13:9)  
October 2012 
Auditor-General’s Report on the Annual Financial Report of the State of Victoria, 
2011–12 (2012–13:10) 
November 2012 
Public Hospitals: Results of the 2011–12 Audits (2012–13:11) November 2012 
Water Entities: Results of the 2011–12 Audits (2012–13:12) November 2012 
Port of Melbourne Channel Deepening Project: Achievement of Objectives  
(2012–13:13) 
November 2012 
Portfolio Departments and Associated Entities: Results of the 2011–12 Audits 
(2012–13:14) 
November 2012 
Local Government: Results of the 2011–12 Audits (2012–13:15) November 2012 
Prison Capacity Planning (2012–13:16) November 2012 
Student Completion Rates (2012–13:17) November 2012 
Management of the Provincial Victoria Growth Fund (2012–13:18) December 2012 
Learning Technologies in Government Schools (2012–13:19) December 2012 
Addressing Homelessness: Partnerships and Plans (2012–13:20) February 2013 
Implementation of School Infrastructure Programs (2012–13:21) February 2013 
Rating Practices in Local Government (2012–13:22) February 2013 
Management of Unplanned Leave in Emergency Services (2012–13:23) March 2013 
Management of Freshwater Fisheries (2012–13:24) March 2013 
Report title Date tabled 
Managing Traffic Congestion (2012–13:25) April 2013 
Consumer Protection (2012–13:26) April 2013 
Public Asset Valuation (2012–13:27) April 2013 
Planning, Delivery and Benefits Realisation of Major Asset Investment: The 
Gateway Review Process (2012–13:28) 
 May 2013 
Tertiary Education and Other Entities: Results of the 2012 Audits (2012–13:29) May 2013 
The State of Victoria’s Children: Performance Reporting (2012–13:30) May 2013 
Management of Staff Occupational Health and Safety in Schools (2012–13:31) May 2013 
Infection Prevention and Control in Public Hospitals (2012–13:32) June 2013 
Organisational Sustainability of Small Councils (2012–13:33) June 2013 
Environment and Sustainability Sector: Performance Reporting (2012–13:34) June 2013 
Flood Relief and Recovery (2012–13:35) June 2013 
VAGO’s website at www.audit.vic.gov.au contains a comprehensive list of all reports issued by VAGO. 
The full text of the reports issued is available at the website.  
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Copies of all reports issued by the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office are available 
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x Victorian Government Bookshop  
Level 20, 80 Collins Street  
Melbourne Vic 3000  
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: 1300 366 356 (local call cost) 
Fax: +61 3 9603 9920 
Email: bookshop@dbi.vic.gov.au 
Website: www.bookshop.vic.gov.au 
x Victorian Auditor-General's Office  
Level 24, 35 Collins Street  
Melbourne Vic 3000  
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: +61 3 8601 7000   
Fax: +61 3 8601 7010  
Email: comments@audit.vic.gov.au 
Website: www.audit.vic.gov.au 
